# Linear Programming and the Most Affordable Healthy Diet — Part 1

Optimization is by far one of the richest ways to apply computer science and mathematics to the real world. Everybody is looking to optimize something: companies want to maximize profits, factories want to maximize efficiency, investors want to minimize risk, the list just goes on and on. The mathematical tools for optimization are also some of the richest mathematical techniques. They form the cornerstone of an entire industry known as operations research, and advances in this field literally change the world.

The mathematical field is called combinatorial optimization, and the name comes from the goal of finding optimal solutions more efficiently than an exhaustive search through every possibility. This post will introduce the most central problem in all of combinatorial optimization, known as the linear program. Even better, we know how to efficiently solve linear programs, so in future posts we’ll write a program that computes the most affordable diet while meeting the recommended health standard.

## Generalizing a Specific Linear Program

Most optimization problems have two parts: an objective function, the thing we want to maximize or minimize, and constraints, rules we must abide by to ensure we get a valid solution. As a simple example you may want to minimize the amount of time you spend doing your taxes (objective function), but you certainly can’t spend a negative amount of time on them (a constraint).

The following more complicated example is the centerpiece of this post. Most people want to minimize the amount of money spent on food. At the same time, one needs to maintain a certain level of nutrition. For males ages 19-30, the United States National Institute for Health recommends 3.7 liters of water per day, 1,000 milligrams of calcium per day, 90 milligrams of vitamin C per day, etc.

We can set up this nutrition problem mathematically, just using a few toy variables. Say we had the option to buy some combination of oranges, milk, and broccoli. Some rough estimates [1] give the following content/costs of these foods. For 0.272 USD you can get 100 grams of orange, containing a total of 53.2mg of calcium, 40mg of vitamin C, and 87g of water. For 0.100 USD you can get 100 grams of whole milk, containing 276mg of calcium, 0mg of vitamin C, and 87g of water. Finally, for 0.381 USD you can get 100 grams of broccoli containing 47mg of calcium, 89.2mg of vitamin C, and 91g of water. Here’s a table summarizing this information:

Nutritional content and prices for 100g of three foods

Food         calcium(mg)     vitamin C(mg)      water(g)   price(USD/100g)
Broccoli     47              89.2               91         0.381
Whole milk   276             0                  87         0.100
Oranges      40              53.2               87         0.272

Some observations: broccoli is more expensive but gets the most of all three nutrients, whole milk doesn’t have any vitamin C but gets a ton of calcium for really cheap, and oranges are a somewhere in between. So you could probably tinker with the quantities and figure out what the cheapest healthy diet is. The problem is what happens when we incorporate hundreds or thousands of food items and tens of nutrient recommendations. This simple example is just to help us build up a nice formality.

So let’s continue doing that. If we denote by $b$ the number of 100g units of broccoli we decide to buy, and $m$ the amount of milk and $r$ the amount of oranges, then we can write the daily cost of food as

$\displaystyle \text{cost}(b,m,r) = 0.381 b + 0.1 m + 0.272 r$

In the interest of being compact (and again, building toward the general linear programming formulation) we can extract the price information into a single cost vector $c = (0.381, 0.1, 0.272)$, and likewise write our variables as a vector $x = (b,m,r)$. We’re implicitly fixing an ordering on the variables that is maintained throughout the problem, but the choice of ordering doesn’t matter. Now the cost function is just the inner product (dot product) of the cost vector and the variable vector $\left \langle c,x \right \rangle$. For some reason lots of people like to write this as $c^Tx$, where $c^T$ denotes the transpose of a matrix, and we imagine that $c$ and $x$ are matrices of size $3 \times 1$. I’ll stick to using the inner product bracket notation.

Now for each type of food we get a specific amount of each nutrient, and the sum of those nutrients needs to be bigger than the minimum recommendation. For example, we want at least 1,000 mg of calcium per day, so we require that $1000 \leq 47b + 276m + 40r$. Likewise, we can write out a table of the constraints by looking at the columns of our table above.

$\displaystyle \begin{matrix} 91b & + & 87m & + & 87r & \geq & 3700 & \text{(water)}\\ 47b & + & 276m & + & 40r & \geq & 1000 & \text{(calcium)} \\ 89.2b & + & 0m & + & 53.2r & \geq & 90 & \text{(vitamin C)} \end{matrix}$

In the same way that we extracted the cost data into a vector to separate it from the variables, we can extract all of the nutrient data into a matrix $A$, and the recommended minimums into a vector $v$. Traditionally the letter $b$ is used for the minimums vector, but for now we’re using $b$ for broccoli.

$A = \begin{pmatrix} 91 & 87 & 87 \\ 47 & 276 & 40 \\ 89.2 & 0 & 53.2 \end{pmatrix}$

$v = \begin{pmatrix} 3700 \\ 1000 \\ 90 \end{pmatrix}$

And now the constraint is that $Ax \geq v$, where the $\geq$ means “greater than or equal to in every coordinate.” So now we can write down the more general form of the problem for our specific matrices and vectors. That is, our problem is to minimize $\left \langle c,x \right \rangle$ subject to the constraint that $Ax \geq v$. This is often written in offset form to contrast it with variations we’ll see in a bit:

$\displaystyle \text{minimize} \left \langle c,x \right \rangle \\ \text{subject to the constraint } Ax \geq v$

In general there’s no reason you can’t have a “negative” amount of one variable. In this problem you can’t buy negative broccoli, so we’ll add the constraints to ensure the variables are nonnegative. So our final form is

$\displaystyle \text{minimize} \left \langle c,x \right \rangle \\ \text{subject to } Ax \geq v \\ \text{and } x \geq 0$

In general, if you have an $m \times n$ matrix $A$, a “minimums” vector $v \in \mathbb{R}^m$, and a cost vector $c \in \mathbb{R}^n$, the problem of finding the vector $x$ that minimizes the cost function while meeting the constraints is called a linear programming problem or simply a linear program.

To satiate the reader’s burning curiosity, the solution for our calcium/vitamin C problem is roughly $x = (1.01, 41.47, 0)$. That is, you should have about 100g of broccoli and 4.2kg of milk (like 4 liters), and skip the oranges entirely. The daily cost is about 4.53 USD. If this seems awkwardly large, it’s because there are cheaper ways to get water than milk.

100g of broccoli (image source: 100-grams.blogspot.com)

## Duality

Now that we’ve seen the general form a linear program and a cute example, we can ask the real meaty question: is there an efficient algorithm that solves arbitrary linear programs? Despite how widely applicable these problems seem, the answer is yes!

But before we can describe the algorithm we need to know more about linear programs. For example, say you have some vector $x$ which satisfies your constraints. How can you tell if it’s optimal? Without such a test we’d have no way to know when to terminate our algorithm. Another problem is that we’ve phrased the problem in terms of minimization, but what about problems where we want to maximize things? Can we use the same algorithm that finds minima to find maxima as well?

Both of these problems are neatly answered by the theory of duality. In mathematics in general, the best way to understand what people mean by “duality” is that one mathematical object uniquely determines two different perspectives, each useful in its own way. And typically a duality theorem provides one with an efficient way to transform one perspective into the other, and relate the information you get from both perspectives. A theory of duality is considered beautiful because it gives you truly deep insight into the mathematical object you care about.

In linear programming duality is between maximization and minimization. In particular, every maximization problem has a unique “dual” minimization problem, and vice versa. The really interesting thing is that the variables you’re trying to optimize in one form correspond to the contraints in the other form! Here’s how one might discover such a beautiful correspondence. We’ll use a made up example with small numbers to make things easy.

So you have this optimization problem

$\displaystyle \begin{matrix} \text{minimize} & 4x_1+3x_2+9x_3 & \\ \text{subject to} & x_1+x_2+x_3 & \geq 6 \\ & 2x_1+x_3 & \geq 2 \\ & x_2+x_3 & \geq 1 & \\ & x_1,x_2,x_3 & \geq 0 \end{matrix}$

Just for giggles let’s write out what $A$ and $c$ are.

$\displaystyle A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 2 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}, c = (4,3,9), v = (6,2,1)$

Say you want to come up with a lower bound on the optimal solution to your problem. That is, you want to know that you can’t make $4x_1 + 3x_2 + 9x_3$ smaller than some number $m$. The constraints can help us derive such lower bounds. In particular, every variable has to be nonnegative, so we know that $4x_1 + 3x_2 + 9x_3 \geq x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \geq 6$, and so 6 is a lower bound on our optimum. Likewise,

\displaystyle \begin{aligned}4x_1+3x_2+9x_3 & \geq 4x_1+4x_3+3x_2+3x_3 \\ &=2(2x_1 + x_3)+3(x_2+x_3) \\ & \geq 2 \cdot 2 + 3 \cdot 1 \\ &=7\end{aligned}

and that’s an even better lower bound than 6. We could try to write this approach down in general: find some numbers $y_1, y_2, y_3$ that we’ll use for each constraint to form

$\displaystyle y_1(\text{constraint 1}) + y_2(\text{constraint 2}) + y_3(\text{constraint 3})$

To make it a valid lower bound we need to ensure that the coefficients of each of the $x_i$ are smaller than the coefficients in the objective function (i.e. that the coefficient of $x_1$ ends up less than 4). And to make it the best lower bound possible we want to maximize what the right-hand-size of the inequality would be: $y_1 6 + y_2 2 + y_3 1$. If you write out these equations and the constraints you get our “lower bound” problem written as

$\displaystyle \begin{matrix} \text{maximize} & 6y_1 + 2y_2 + y_3 & \\ \text{subject to} & y_1 + 2y_2 & \leq 4 \\ & y_1 + y_3 & \leq 3 \\ & y_1+y_2 + y_3 & \leq 9 \\ & y_1,y_2,y_3 & \geq 0 \end{matrix}$

And wouldn’t you know, the matrix providing the constraints is $A^T$, and the vectors $c$ and $v$ switched places.

$\displaystyle A^T = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$

This is no coincidence. All linear programs can be transformed in this way, and it would be a useful exercise for the reader to turn the above maximization problem back into a minimization problem by the same technique (computing linear combinations of the constraints to make upper bounds). You’ll be surprised to find that you get back to the original minimization problem! This is part of what makes it “duality,” because the dual of the dual is the original thing again. Often, when we fix the “original” problem, we call it the primal form to distinguish it from the dual form. Usually the primal problem is the one that is easy to interpret.

(Note: because we’re done with broccoli for now, we’re going to use $b$ to denote the constraint vector that used to be $v$.)

Now say you’re given the data of a linear program for minimization, that is the vectors $c, b$ and matrix $A$ for the problem, “minimize $\left \langle c, x \right \rangle$ subject to $Ax \geq b; x \geq 0$.” We can make a general definition: the dual linear program is the maximization problem “maximize $\left \langle b, y \right \rangle$ subject to $A^T y \leq c, y \geq 0$.” Here $y$ is the new set of variables and the superscript T denotes the transpose of the matrix. The constraint for the dual is often written $y^T A \leq c^T$, again identifying vectors with a single-column matrices, but I find the swamp of transposes pointless and annoying (why do things need to be columns?).

Now we can actually prove that the objective function for the dual provides a bound on the objective function for the original problem. It’s obvious from the work we’ve done, which is why it’s called the weak duality theorem.

Weak Duality Theorem: Let $c, A, b$ be the data of a linear program in the primal form (the minimization problem) whose objective function is $\left \langle c, x \right \rangle$. Recall that the objective function of the dual (maximization) problem is $\left \langle b, y \right \rangle$. If $x,y$ are feasible solutions (satisfy the constraints of their respective problems), then

$\left \langle b, y \right \rangle \leq \left \langle c, x \right \rangle$

In other words, the maximum of the dual is a lower bound on the minimum of the primal problem and vice versa. Moreover, any feasible solution for one provides a bound on the other.

Proof. The proof is pleasingly simple. Just inspect the quantity $\left \langle A^T y, x \right \rangle = \left \langle y, Ax \right \rangle$. The constraints from the definitions of the primal and dual give us that

$\left \langle y, b \right \rangle \leq \left \langle y, Ax \right \rangle = \left \langle A^Ty, x \right \rangle \leq \left \langle c,x \right \rangle$

The inequalities follow from the linear algebra fact that if the $u$ in $\left \langle u,v \right \rangle$ is nonnegative, then you can only increase the size of the product by increasing the components of $v$. This is why we need the nonnegativity constraints.

In fact, the world is much more pleasing. There is a theorem that says the two optimums are equal!

Strong Duality Theorem: If there are any solutions $x,y$ to the primal (minimization) problem and the dual (maximization) problem, respectively, then the two problems also have optimal solutions $x^*, y^*$, and two candidate solutions $x^*, y^*$ are optimal if and only if they produce equal objective values $\left \langle c, x^* \right \rangle = \left \langle y^*, b \right \rangle$.

The proof of this theorem is a bit more convoluted than the weak duality theorem, and the key technique is a lemma of Farkas and its variations. See the second half of these notes for a full proof. The nice thing is that this theorem gives us a way to tell if an algorithm to solve linear programs is done: maintain a pair of feasible solutions to the primal and dual problems, improve them by some rule, and stop when the two solutions give equal objective values. The hard part, then, is finding a principled and guaranteed way to improve a given pair of solutions.

On the other hand, you can also prove the strong duality theorem by inventing an algorithm that provably terminates. We’ll see such an algorithm, known as the simplex algorithm in the next post. Sneak peek: it’s a lot like Gaussian elimination. Then we’ll use the algorithm (or an equivalent industry-strength version) to solve a much bigger nutrition problem.

In fact, you can do a bit better than the strong duality theorem, in terms of coming up with a stopping condition for a linear programming algorithm. You can observe that an optimal solution implies further constraints on the relationship between the primal and the dual problems. In particular, this is called the complementary slackness conditions, and they essentially say that if an optimal solution to the primal has a positive variable then the corresponding constraint in the dual problem must be tight (is an equality) to get an optimal solution to the dual. The contrapositive says that if some constraint is slack, or a strict inequality, then either the corresponding variable is zero or else the solution is not optimal. More formally,

Theorem (Complementary Slackness Conditions): Let $A, c, b$ be the data of the primal form of a linear program, “minimize $\left \langle c, x \right \rangle$ subject to $Ax \geq b, x \geq 0$.” Then $x^*, y^*$ are optimal solutions to the primal and dual problems if any only if all of the following conditions hold.

• $x^*, y^*$ are both feasible for their respective problems.
• Whenever $x^*_i > 0$ the corresponding constraint $A^T_i y^* = c_i$ is an equality.
• Whenever $y^*_j > 0$ the corresponding constraint $A_j x^* = b_j$ is an equality.

Here we denote by $M_i$ the $i$-th row of the matrix $M$ and $v_i$ to denote the $i$-th entry of a vector. Another way to write the condition using vectors instead of English is

$\left \langle x^*, A^T y^* - c \right \rangle = 0$
$\left \langle y^*, Ax^* - b \right \rangle$

The proof follows from the duality theorems, and just involves pushing around some vector algebra. See section 6.2 of these notes.

One can interpret complementary slackness in linear programs in a lot of different ways. For us, it will simply be a termination condition for an algorithm: one can efficiently check all of these conditions for the nonzero variables and stop if they’re all satisfied or if we find a variable that violates a slackness condition. Indeed, in more mature optimization analyses, the slackness condition that is more egregiously violated can provide evidence for where a candidate solution can best be improved. For a more intricate and detailed story about how to interpret the complementary slackness conditions, see Section 4 of these notes by Joel Sobel.

Finally, before we close we should note there are geometric ways to think about linear programming. I have my preferred visualization in my head, but I have yet to find a suitable animation on the web that replicates it. Here’s one example in two dimensions. The set of constraints define a convex geometric region in the plane

The constraints define a convex area of “feasible solutions.” Image source: Wikipedia.

Now the optimization function $f(x) = \left \langle c,x \right \rangle$ is also a linear function, and if you fix some output value $y = f(x)$ this defines a line in the plane. As $y$ changes, the line moves along its normal vector (that is, all these fixed lines are parallel). Now to geometrically optimize the target function, we can imagine starting with the line $f(x) = 0$, and sliding it along its normal vector in the direction that keeps it in the feasible region. We can keep sliding it in this direction, and the maximum of the function is just the last instant that this line intersects the feasible region. If none of the constraints are parallel to the family of lines defined by $f$, then this is guaranteed to occur at a vertex of the feasible region. Otherwise, there will be a family of optima lying anywhere on the line segment of last intersection.

In higher dimensions, the only change is that the lines become affine subspaces of dimension $n-1$. That means in three dimensions you’re sliding planes, in four dimensions you’re sliding 3-dimensional hyperplanes, etc. The facts about the last intersection being a vertex or a “line segment” still hold. So as we’ll see next time, successful algorithms for linear programming in practice take advantage of this observation by efficiently traversing the vertices of this convex region. We’ll see this in much more detail in the next post.

Until then!

# Stable Marriages and Designing Markets

Here is a fun puzzle. Suppose we have a group of 10 men and 10 women, and each of the men has sorted the women in order of their preference for marriage (that is, a man prefers to marry a woman earlier in his list over a woman later in the list). Likewise, each of the women has sorted the men in order of marriageability. We might ask if there is any way that we, the omniscient cupids of love, can decide who should marry to make everyone happy.

Of course, the word happy is entirely imprecise. The mathematician balks at the prospect of leaving such terms undefined! In this case, it’s quite obvious that not everyone will get their first pick. Indeed, if even two women prefer the same man someone will have to settle for less than their top choice. So if we define happiness in this naive way, the problem is obviously not solvable in general.

Now what if instead of aiming for each individual’s maximum happiness we instead shoot for mutual contentedness? That is, what if “happiness” here means that nobody will ever have an incentive to cheat on their spouse? It turns out that for a mathematical version of this condition, we can always find a suitable set of marriages! These mathematical formalisms include some assumptions, such as that preferences never change and that no new individuals are added to the population. But it is nevertheless an impressive theorem that we can achieve stability no matter what everyone’s preferences are. In this post we’ll give the classical algorithm which constructs so-called “stable marriages,” and we’ll prove its correctness. Then we’ll see a slight generalization of the algorithm, in which the marriages are “polygamous,” and we’ll apply it to the problem of assigning students to internships.

As usual, all of the code used in this post is available for download at this blog’s Github page.

## Historical Notes

The original algorithm for computing stable marriages was discovered by Lloyd Shapley and David Gale in the early 1960’s. Shapely and Alvin Roth went on to dedicate much of their career to designing markets and applying the stable marriage problem and its generalizations to such problems. In 2012 they jointly received the Nobel prize in economics for their work on this problem. If you want to know more about what “market design” means and why it’s needed (and you have an hour to spare), consider watching the talk below by Alvin Roth at the Simons Institute’s 2013 Symposium on the Visions of the Theory of Computing. Roth spends most of his time discussing the state of one particular economy, medical students and residence positions at hospitals, which he was asked to redesign. It’s quite a fascinating tale, although some of the deeper remarks assume knowledge of the algorithm we cover in this post.

Alvin Roth went on to apply the ideas presented in the video to economic systems in Boston and New York City public schools, kidney exchanges, and others. They all had the same sort of structure: both parties have preferences and stability makes sense. So he actually imposed the protocol we’re about to describe in order to guarantee that the process terminates to a stable arrangement (and automating it saves everyone involved a lot of time, stress, and money! Watch the video above for more on that).

## The Monogamous Stable Marriage Algorithm

Let’s formally set up the problem. Let $X = \left \{ 1, 2, \dots, n \right \}$ be a set of $n$ suitors and $Y = \left \{ 1,2,\dots ,n \right \}$ be a set of $n$ “suited.” Let $\textup{pref}_{X \to Y}: X \to S_n$ be a list of preferences for the suitors. In words, $\textup{pref}_{X \to Y}$ accepts as input a suitor, and produces as output an ordering on the suited members of $Y$. We denote the output set as $S_n$, which the group theory folks will recognize as the permutation group on $1, \dots, n$. Likewise, there is a function $\textup{pref}_{Y \to X}: Y \to S_n$ describing the preferences of each of the suited.

An example will help clarify these stuffy definitions. If $X = \left \{ 1, 2, 3 \right \}$ and $Y = \left \{ 1, 2, 3 \right \}$, then to say that

$\textup{pref}_{X \to Y}(2) = (3, 1, 2)$

is to say that the second suitor prefers the third member of $Y$ the most, and then the first member of $Y$, and then the second. The programmer might imagine that the datum of the problem consists of two dictionaries (one for $X$ and one for $Y$) whose keys are integers and whose values are lists of integers which contain 1 through $n$ in some order.

A solution to the problem, then, is a way to match (or marry) suitors with suited. Specifically, a matching is a bijection $m: X \to Y$, so that $x$ is matched with $m(x)$. The reason we use a bijection is because the marriages are monogamous: only one suitor can be matched with one suited and vice versa. Later we’ll see this condition dropped so we can apply it to a more realistic problem of institutions (suited) which can accommodate many applicants (suitors). Because suitor and suited are awkward to say, we’ll use the familiar, antiquated, and politically incorrect terms “men and women.”

Now if we’re given a monogamous matching $m$, a pair $x \in X, y \in Y$ is called unstable for $m$ if both $x,y$ prefer each other over their partners assigned by $m$. That is, $(x,y)$ is unstable for $m$ if $y$ appears before $m(y)$ in the preference list for $x$, $\textup{pref}_{X \to Y}(x)$, and likewise $x$ appears before $m^{-1}(y)$ in $\textup{pref}_{Y \to X}(y)$.

Another example to clarify: again let $X = Y = \left \{ 1,2,3 \right \}$ and suppose for simplicity that our matching $m$ pairs $m(i) = i$. If man 2 has the preference list $(3,2,1)$ and woman 3 has the preference list $(2,1,3)$, then 2 and 3 together form an unstable pair for $m$, because they would rather be with each other over their current partners. That is, they have a mutual incentive to cheat on their spouses. We say that the matching is unstable or admits an unstable pair if there are any unstable pairs for it, and we call the entire matching stable if it doesn’t admit any unstable pairs.

Unlike real life, mathematically unstable marriages need not feature constant arguments.

So the question at hand is: is there an algorithm which, given access to to the two sets of preferences, can efficiently produce a stable matching? We can also wonder whether a stable matching is guaranteed to exist, and the answer is yes. In fact, we’ll prove this and produce an efficient algorithm in one fell swoop.

The central concept of the algorithm is called deferred acceptance. The gist is like this. The algorithm operates in rounds. During each round, each man will “propose” to a woman, and each woman will pick the best proposal available. But the women will not commit to their pick. They instead reject all other suitors, who go on to propose to their second choices in the next round. At that stage each woman (who now may have a more preferred suitor than in the first round) may replace her old pick with a new one. The process continues in this manner until each man is paired with a woman. In this way, each of the women defers accepting any proposal until the end of the round, progressively increasing the quality of her choice. Likewise, the men progressively propose less preferred matches as the rounds progress.

It’s easy to argue such a process must eventually converge. Indeed, the contrary means there’s some sort of cycle in the order of proposals, but each man proposes to only strictly less preferred women than any previous round, and the women can only strictly increase the quality of their held pick. Mathematically, we’re using an important tool called monotonicity. That some quantity can only increase or decrease as time goes on, and since the quantity is bounded, we must eventually reach a local maximum. From there, we can prove that any local maximum satisfies the property we want (here, that the matching is stable), and we win. Indeed, supposing to the contrary that we have a pair $(x,y)$ which is unstable for the matching $m$ produced at the end of this process, then it must have been the case that $x$ proposed to $y$ in some earlier round. But $y$ has as her final match some other suitor $x' = m^{-1}(y)$ whom she prefers less than $x$. Though she may have never picked $x$ at any point in the algorithm, she can only end up with the worse choice $x'$ if at some point $y$ chose a suitor that was less preferred than the suitor she already had. Since her choices are monotonic this cannot happen, so no unstable pairs can exist.

Rather than mathematically implement the algorithm in pseudocode, let’s produce the entire algorithm in Python to make the ideas completely concrete.

## Python Implementation

We start off with some simple data definitions for the two parties which, in the renewed interest of generality, refer to as Suitor and Suited.

class Suitor(object):
def __init__(self, id, prefList):
self.prefList = prefList
self.rejections = 0 # num rejections is also the index of the next option
self.id = id

def preference(self):
return self.prefList[self.rejections]

def __repr__(self):
return repr(self.id)


A Suitor is simple enough: he has an id representing his “index” in the set of Suitors, and a preference list prefList which in its $i$-th position contains the Suitor’s $i$-th most preferred Suited. This is identical to our mathematical representation from earlier, where a list like $(2,3,1)$ means that the Suitor prefers the second Suited most and the first Suited least. Knowing the algorithm ahead of time, we add an additional piece of data: the number of rejections the Suitor has seen so far. This will double as the index of the Suited that the Suitor is currently proposing to. Indeed, the preference function provides a thin layer of indirection allowing us to ignore the underlying representation, so long as one updates the number of rejections appropriately.

Now for the Suited.

class Suited(object):
def __init__(self, id, prefList):
self.prefList = prefList
self.held = None
self.currentSuitors = set()
self.id = id

def __repr__(self):
return repr(self.id)


A Suited likewise has a list of preferences and an id, but in addition she has a held attribute for the currently held Suitor, and a list currentSuitors of Suitors that are currently proposing to her. Hence we can define a reject method which accepts no inputs, and returns a list of rejected suitors, while updating the woman’s state to hold onto her most preferred suitor.

   def reject(self):
if len(self.currentSuitors) == 0:
return set()

if self.held is not None:

self.held = min(self.currentSuitors, key=lambda suitor: self.prefList.index(suitor.id))
rejected = self.currentSuitors - set([self.held])
self.currentSuitors = set()

return rejected


The call to min does all the work: finding the Suitor that appears first in her preference list. The rest is bookkeeping. Now the algorithm for finding a stable marriage, following the deferred acceptance algorithm, is simple.

# monogamousStableMarriage: [Suitor], [Suited] -> {Suitor -> Suited}
# construct a stable (monogamous) marriage between suitors and suiteds
def monogamousStableMarriage(suitors, suiteds):
unassigned = set(suitors)

while len(unassigned) > 0:
for suitor in unassigned:
unassigned = set()

for suited in suiteds:
unassigned |= suited.reject()

for suitor in unassigned:
suitor.rejections += 1

return dict([(suited.held, suited) for suited in suiteds])


All the Suitors are unassigned to begin with. Each iteration of the loop corresponds to a round of the algorithm: the Suitors are added to the currentSuitors list of their next most preferred Suited. Then the Suiteds “simultaneously” reject some Suitors, whose rejection counts are upped by one and returned to the pool of unassigned Suitors. Once every Suited has held onto a Suitor we’re done.

Given a matching, we can define a function that verifies by brute force that the marriage is stable.

# verifyStable: [Suitor], [Suited], {Suitor -> Suited} -> bool
# check that the assignment of suitors to suited is a stable marriage
def verifyStable(suitors, suiteds, marriage):
import itertools
suitedToSuitor = dict((v,k) for (k,v) in marriage.items())
precedes = lambda L, item1, item2: L.index(item1) < L.index(item2)

def suitorPrefers(suitor, suited):
return precedes(suitor.prefList, suited.id, marriage[suitor].id)

def suitedPrefers(suited, suitor):
return precedes(suited.prefList, suitor.id, suitedToSuitor[suited].id)

for (suitor, suited) in itertools.product(suitors, suiteds):
if suited != marriage[suitor] and suitorPrefers(suitor, suited) and suitedPrefers(suited, suitor):
return False, (suitor.id, suited.id)

return


Indeed, we can test the algorithm on an instance of the problem.

>>> suitors = [Suitor(0, [3,5,4,2,1,0]), Suitor(1, [2,3,1,0,4,5]),
...            Suitor(2, [5,2,1,0,3,4]), Suitor(3, [0,1,2,3,4,5]),
...            Suitor(4, [4,5,1,2,0,3]), Suitor(5, [0,1,2,3,4,5])]
>>> suiteds = [Suited(0, [3,5,4,2,1,0]), Suited(1, [2,3,1,0,4,5]),
...            Suited(2, [5,2,1,0,3,4]), Suited(3, [0,1,2,3,4,5]),
...            Suited(4, [4,5,1,2,0,3]), Suited(5, [0,1,2,3,4,5])]
>>> marriage = monogamousStableMarriage(suitors, suiteds)
{3: 0, 4: 4, 5: 1, 1: 2, 2: 5, 0: 3}
>>> verifyStable(suitors, suiteds, marriage)
True


We encourage the reader to check this by hand (this one only took two rounds). Even better, answer the question of whether the algorithm could ever require $n$ steps to converge for $2n$ individuals, where you get to pick the preference list to try to make this scenario happen.

## Stable Marriages with Capacity

We can extend this algorithm to work for “polygamous” marriages in which one Suited can accept multiple Suitors. In fact, the two problems are entirely the same! Just imagine duplicating a Suited with large capacity into many Suiteds with capacity of 1. This particular reduction is not very efficient, but it allows us to see that the same proof of convergence and correctness applies. We can then modify our classes and algorithm to account for it, so that (for example) instead of a Suited “holding” a single Suitor, she holds a set of Suitors. We encourage the reader to try extending our code above to the polygamous case as an exercise, and we’ve provided the solution in the code repository for this post on this blog’s Github page.

## Ways to Make it Harder

When you study algorithmic graph problems as much as I do, you start to get disheartened. It seems like every problem is NP-hard or worse. So when we get a situation like this, a nice, efficient algorithm with very real consequences and interpretations, you start to get very excited. In between our heaves of excitement, we imagine all the other versions of this problem that we could solve and Nobel prizes we could win. Unfortunately the landscape is bleaker than that, and most extensions of stable marriage problems are NP-complete.

For example, what if we allow ties? That is, one man can be equally happy with two women. This is NP-complete. However, it turns out his extension can be formulated as an integer programming problem, and standard optimization techniques can be used to approximate a solution.

What if, thinking about the problem in terms of medical students and residencies, we allow people to pick their preferences as couples? Some med students are married, after all, and prefer to be close to their spouse even if it means they have a less preferred residency. NP-hard again. See page 53 (pdf page 71) of these notes for a more detailed investigation. The problem is essentially that there is not always a stable matching, and so even determining whether there is one is NP-complete.

So there are a lot of ways to enrich the problem, and there’s an interesting line between tractable and hard in the worst case. As a (relatively difficult) exercise, try to solve the “roommates” version of the problem, where there is no male/female distinction (anyone can be matched with anyone). It turns out to have a tractable solution, and the algorithm is similar to the one outlined in this post.

Until next time!

PS. I originally wrote this post about a year ago when I was contacted by someone in industry who agreed to provide some (anonymized) data listing the preferences of companies and interns applying to work at those companies. Not having heard from them for almost a year, I figure it’s a waste to let this finished post collect dust at the risk of not having an interesting data set. But if you, dear reader, have any data you’d like to provide that fits into the framework of stable marriages, I’d love to feature your company/service on my blog (and solve the matching problem) in exchange for the data. The only caveat is that the data would have to be public, so you would have to anonymize it.

# Where Math ∩ Programming is Headed

This week is Spring break at UI Chicago. While I’ll be spending most of it working, it does give me some downtime to reflect. We’ve come pretty far, dear reader, in these almost three years. I learned, you learned. We all laughed. My blog has become my infinite source of entertainment and an invaluable tool for synthesizing my knowledge.

But the more I write the more ideas I have for articles, and this has been accelerating. I’m currently sitting on 55 unfinished drafts ranging from just a title and an idea to an almost-completed post. A lot of these ideas have long chains of dependencies (I can’t help myself but write on all the background math I can stomach before I do the applications). So one day I decided to draw up a little dependency graph to map out my coarse future plans. Here it is:

A map of most of my current plans for blog posts and series, and their relationships to one another. Click to enlarge.

Now all you elliptic curve fanatics can rest assured I’ll continue working that series to completion before starting on any of these big projects. This map basically gives a rough picture of things I’ve read about, studied, and been interested in over the past two years that haven’t already made it onto this blog. Some of the nodes represent passed milestones in my intellectual career, while others represent topics yet to be fully understood. Note very few specific applications are listed here (e.g., what might I use SVM to classify?), but I do have ideas for a lot of them. And note that these are very long term plans, some of which are likely never to come to fruition.

So nows your chance to speak up. What do you want to read about? What do you think is missing?

# Simulating a Biased Coin with a Fair Coin

This is a guest post by my friend and colleague Adam Lelkes. Adam’s interests are in algebra and theoretical computer science. This gem came up because Adam gave a talk on probabilistic computation in which he discussed this technique.

Problem: simulate a biased coin using a fair coin.

Solution: (in Python)

def biasedCoin(binaryDigitStream, fairCoin):
for d in binaryDigitStream:
if fairCoin() != d:
return d


Discussion: This function takes two arguments, an iterator representing the binary expansion of the intended probability of getting 1 (let us denote it as $p$) and another function that returns 1 or 0 with equal probability. At first glance this might seem like an overcomplicated way of solving this problem: why can’t the probability be a floating point number?

The point is that $p$ can have infinite precision! Assuming that fairCoin() gives us a perfectly random stream of 1’s and 0’s (independently and with probability 1/2) and we can read each bit of the binary expansion of $p$, this function returns 1 with probability exactly $p$ even if $p$ is irrational or a fraction with infinite decimal expansion. If we used floating point arithmetic there would be a small chance we get unlucky and exhaust the precision available. We would only get an approximation of the true bias at best.

Now let us explain why this algorithm works. We keep tossing our fair coins to get a sequence of random bits, until one of our random bits is different from the corresponding bit in the binary expansion of $p$. If we stop after $i$ steps, that means that the first $i-1$ bits in the two binary sequences were the same, which happens with probability $\frac{1}{2^{i-1}}$. Given that this happens, in the $i$th step we will return the $i$th bit of $p$; let us denote this bit by $p_i$. Then the probability of returning 1 is $\sum_{i=1}^\infty \frac{p_i}{2^{i-1}}$, which is the binary expansion of $p$.

This algorithm is also efficient. By efficient here we mean that the expected running time is constant. Of course, to show this we need to make some assumption about the computational complexity of calculating the bits of $p$. If we assume that the bits of $p$ are efficiently computable in the sense that the time required to compute $p_i$ is bounded by a polynomial in $i$, then this algorithm does run in constant expected time.

Indeed, the expected running time is $\sum_{i=0}^\infty \frac{i^n}{2^i}$. Showing that this sum is a constant is an easy calculus exercise: using the ratio test we get that

$\displaystyle \textup{limsup}_{i \to \infty} \left | \frac{\frac{(i+1)^n}{2^{i+1}}}{\frac{i^n}{2^i}} \right | = \limsup_{i\to\infty} \frac{\left(\frac{i+1}{i}\right)^n}{2} = \frac{1}{2} < 1$,

thus the series is convergent.

Now that we proved that our algorithm works, it’s time to try it! Let’s say that we want to simulate a coin which gives “heads” with probability 1/3.
We need to construct our binary digit stream. Since 1/3 is 0.010101… in binary, we could use the following simple generator:

def oneThird():
while True:
yield 0
yield 1


However, we might want to have a more general generator that gives us the binary representation of any number. The following function, which takes a number between 0 and 1 as its argument, does the job:

def binaryDigits(fraction):
while True:
fraction *= 2
yield int(fraction)
fraction = fraction % 1


We also need a fair coin simulator. For this simulation, let’s just use Python’s built-in pseudo-random number generator:

def fairCoin():
return random.choice([0,1])


Let us toss our biased coin 10000 times and take the sum. We expect the sum to be around 3333. Indeed, when I tried

>>> sum(biasedCoin(oneThird(), fairCoin) for i in range(10000))
3330


It might be worth noting oneThird() is approximately ten times faster than binaryDigits(fractions.Fraction(1,3)), so when a large number of biased coins is needed, you can hardwire the binary representation of $p$ into the program.