# Binary Search on Graphs

Binary search is one of the most basic algorithms I know. Given a sorted list of comparable items and a target item being sought, binary search looks at the middle of the list, and compares it to the target. If the target is larger, we repeat on the smaller half of the list, and vice versa.

With each comparison the binary search algorithm cuts the search space in half. The result is a guarantee of no more than $\log(n)$ comparisons, for a total runtime of $O(\log n)$. Neat, efficient, useful.

There’s always another angle.

What if we tried to do binary search on a graph? Most graph search algorithms, like breadth- or depth-first search, take linear time, and they were invented by some pretty smart cookies. So if binary search on a graph is going to make any sense, it’ll have to use more information beyond what a normal search algorithm has access to.

For binary search on a list, it’s the fact that the list is sorted, and we can compare against the sought item to guide our search. But really, the key piece of information isn’t related to the comparability of the items. It’s that we can eliminate half of the search space at every step. The “compare against the target” step can be thought of a black box that replies to queries of the form, “Is this the thing I’m looking for?” with responses of the form, “Yes,” or, “No, but look over here instead.”

As long as the answers to your queries are sufficiently helpful, meaning they allow you to cut out large portions of your search space at each step, then you probably have a good algorithm on your hands. Indeed, there’s a natural model for graphs, defined in a 2015 paper of Emamjomeh-Zadeh, Kempe, and Singhal that goes as follows.

You’re given as input an undirected, weighted graph $G = (V,E)$, with weights $w_e$ for $e \in E$. You can see the entire graph, and you may ask questions of the form, “Is vertex $v$ the target?” Responses will be one of two things:

• Yes (you win!)
• No, but $e = (v, w)$ is an edge out of $v$ on a shortest path from $v$ to the true target.

Your goal is to find the target vertex with the minimum number of queries.

Obviously this only works if $G$ is connected, but slight variations of everything in this post work for disconnected graphs. (The same is not true in general for directed graphs)

When the graph is a line, this “reduces” to binary search in the sense that the same basic idea of binary search works: start in the middle of the graph, and the edge you get in response to a query will tell you in which half of the graph to continue.

And if we make this example only slightly more complicated, the generalization should become obvious:

Here, we again start at the “center vertex,” and the response to our query will eliminate one of the two halves. But then how should we pick the next vertex, now that we no longer have a linear order to rely on? It should be clear, choose the “center vertex” of whichever half we end up in. This choice can be formalized into a rule that works even when there’s not such obvious symmetry, and it turns out to always be the right choice.

Definition: median of a weighted graph $G$ with respect to a subset of vertices $S \subset V$ is a vertex $v \in V$ (not necessarily in $S$) which minimizes the sum of distances to vertices in $S$. More formally, it minimizes

$\Phi_S(v) = \sum_{u \in S} d(v, u)$,

where $d(u,v)$ is the sum of the edge weights along a shortest path from $v$ to $u$.

And so generalizing binary search to this query-model on a graph results in the following algorithm, which whittles down the search space by querying the median at every step.

Algorithm: Binary search on graphs. Input is a graph $G = (V,E)$.

• Start with a set of candidates $S = V$.
• While we haven’t found the target and $|S| > 1$:
• Query the median $v$ of $S$, and stop if you’ve found the target.
• Otherwise, let $e = (v, w)$ be the response edge, and compute the set of all vertices $x \in V$ for which $e$ is on a shortest path from $v$ to $x$. Call this set $T$.
• Replace $S$ with $S \cap T$.
• Output the only remaining vertex in $S$

Indeed, as we’ll see momentarily, a python implementation is about as simple. The meat of the work is in computing the median and the set $T$, both of which are slight variants of Dijkstra’s algorithm for computing shortest paths.

The theorem, which is straightforward and well written by Emamjomeh-Zadeh et al. (only about a half page on page 5), is that this algorithm requires only $O(\log(n))$ queries, just like binary search.

Before we dive into an implementation, there’s a catch. Even though we are guaranteed only $\log(n)$ many queries, because of our Dijkstra’s algorithm implementation, we’re definitely not going to get a logarithmic time algorithm. So in what situation would this be useful?

Here’s where we use the “theory” trick of making up a fanciful problem and only later finding applications for it (which, honestly, has been quite successful in computer science). In this scenario we’re treating the query mechanism as a black box. It’s natural to imagine that the queries are expensive, and a resource we want to optimize for. As an example the authors bring up in a followup paper, the graph might be the set of clusterings of a dataset, and the query involves a human looking at the data and responding that a cluster should be split, or that two clusters should be joined. Of course, for clustering the underlying graph is too large to process, so the median-finding algorithm needs to be implicit. But the essential point is clear: sometimes the query is the most expensive part of the algorithm.

Alright, now let’s implement it! The complete code is on Github as always.

## Always be implementing

We start with a slight variation of Dijkstra’s algorithm. Here we’re given as input a single “starting” vertex, and we produce as output a list of all shortest paths from the start to all possible destination vertices.

from collections import defaultdict
from collections import namedtuple

Edge = namedtuple('Edge', ('source', 'target', 'weight'))

class Graph:
# A bare-bones implementation of a weighted, undirected graph
def __init__(self, vertices, edges=tuple()):
self.vertices = vertices
self.incident_edges = defaultdict(list)

for edge in edges:
edge[0],
edge[1],
1 if len(edge) == 2 else edge[2]  # optional weight
)

self.incident_edges[u].append(Edge(u, v, weight))
self.incident_edges[v].append(Edge(v, u, weight))

def edge(self, u, v):
return [e for e in self.incident_edges[u] if e.target == v][0]


And then, since most of the work in Dijkstra’s algorithm is tracking information that you build up as you search the graph, we define the “output” data structure, a dictionary of edge weights paired with back-pointers for the discovered shortest paths.

class DijkstraOutput:
def __init__(self, graph, start):
self.start = start
self.graph = graph

# the smallest distance from the start to the destination v
self.distance_from_start = {v: math.inf for v in graph.vertices}
self.distance_from_start[start] = 0

# a list of predecessor edges for each destination
# to track a list of possibly many shortest paths
self.predecessor_edges = {v: [] for v in graph.vertices}

def found_shorter_path(self, vertex, edge, new_distance):
# update the solution with a newly found shorter path
self.distance_from_start[vertex] = new_distance

if new_distance < self.distance_from_start[vertex]:
self.predecessor_edges[vertex] = [edge]
else:  # tie for multiple shortest paths
self.predecessor_edges[vertex].append(edge)

def path_to_destination_contains_edge(self, destination, edge):
predecessors = self.predecessor_edges[destination]
if edge in predecessors:
return True
return any(self.path_to_destination_contains_edge(e.source, edge)
for e in predecessors)

def sum_of_distances(self, subset=None):
subset = subset or self.graph.vertices
return sum(self.distance_from_start[x] for x in subset)


The actual Dijkstra algorithm then just does a “breadth-first” (priority-queue-guided) search through $G$, updating the metadata as it finds shorter paths.

def single_source_shortest_paths(graph, start):
'''
Compute the shortest paths and distances from the start vertex to all
possible destination vertices. Return an instance of DijkstraOutput.
'''
output = DijkstraOutput(graph, start)
visit_queue = [(0, start)]

while len(visit_queue) > 0:
priority, current = heapq.heappop(visit_queue)

for incident_edge in graph.incident_edges[current]:
v = incident_edge.target
weight = incident_edge.weight
distance_from_current = output.distance_from_start[current] + weight

if distance_from_current <= output.distance_from_start[v]:
output.found_shorter_path(v, incident_edge, distance_from_current)
heapq.heappush(visit_queue, (distance_from_current, v))

return output


Finally, we implement the median-finding and $T$-computing subroutines:

def possible_targets(graph, start, edge):
'''
Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), an input vertex v in V, and an edge e
incident to v, compute the set of vertices w such that e is on a shortest path from
v to w.
'''
dijkstra_output = dijkstra.single_source_shortest_paths(graph, start)
return set(v for v in graph.vertices
if dijkstra_output.path_to_destination_contains_edge(v, edge))

def find_median(graph, vertices):
'''
Compute as output a vertex in the input graph which minimizes the sum of distances
to the input set of vertices
'''
best_dijkstra_run = min(
(single_source_shortest_paths(graph, v) for v in graph.vertices),
key=lambda run: run.sum_of_distances(vertices)
)
return best_dijkstra_run.start


And then the core algorithm

QueryResult = namedtuple('QueryResult', ('found_target', 'feedback_edge'))

def binary_search(graph, query):
'''
Find a target node in a graph, with queries of the form "Is x the target?"
and responses either "You found the target!" or "Here is an edge on a shortest
path to the target."
'''
candidate_nodes = set(x for x in graph.vertices)  # copy

while len(candidate_nodes) > 1:
median = find_median(graph, candidate_nodes)
query_result = query(median)

if query_result.found_target:
return median
else:
edge = query_result.feedback_edge
legal_targets = possible_targets(graph, median, edge)
candidate_nodes = candidate_nodes.intersection(legal_targets)

return candidate_nodes.pop()


Here’s an example of running it on the example graph we used earlier in the post:

'''
Graph looks like this tree, with uniform weights

a       k
b     j
cfghi
d     l
e       m
'''
G = Graph(['a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'i',
'j', 'k', 'l', 'm'],
[
('a', 'b'),
('b', 'c'),
('c', 'd'),
('d', 'e'),
('c', 'f'),
('f', 'g'),
('g', 'h'),
('h', 'i'),
('i', 'j'),
('j', 'k'),
('i', 'l'),
('l', 'm'),
])

def simple_query(v):
ans = input("is '%s' the target? [y/N] " % v)
if ans and ans.lower()[0] == 'y':
return QueryResult(True, None)
else:
print("Please input a vertex on the shortest path between"
" '%s' and the target. The graph is: " % v)
for w in G.incident_edges:
print("%s: %s" % (w, G.incident_edges[w]))

target = None
while target not in G.vertices:
target = input("Input neighboring vertex of '%s': " % v)

return QueryResult(
False,
G.edge(v, target)
)

output = binary_search(G, simple_query)
print("Found target: %s" % output)


The query function just prints out a reminder of the graph and asks the user to answer the query with a yes/no and a relevant edge if the answer is no.

An example run:

is 'g' the target? [y/N] n
Please input a vertex on the shortest path between 'g' and the target. The graph is:
e: [Edge(source='e', target='d', weight=1)]
i: [Edge(source='i', target='h', weight=1), Edge(source='i', target='j', weight=1), Edge(source='i', target='l', weight=1)]
g: [Edge(source='g', target='f', weight=1), Edge(source='g', target='h', weight=1)]
l: [Edge(source='l', target='i', weight=1), Edge(source='l', target='m', weight=1)]
k: [Edge(source='k', target='j', weight=1)]
j: [Edge(source='j', target='i', weight=1), Edge(source='j', target='k', weight=1)]
c: [Edge(source='c', target='b', weight=1), Edge(source='c', target='d', weight=1), Edge(source='c', target='f', weight=1)]
f: [Edge(source='f', target='c', weight=1), Edge(source='f', target='g', weight=1)]
m: [Edge(source='m', target='l', weight=1)]
d: [Edge(source='d', target='c', weight=1), Edge(source='d', target='e', weight=1)]
h: [Edge(source='h', target='g', weight=1), Edge(source='h', target='i', weight=1)]
b: [Edge(source='b', target='a', weight=1), Edge(source='b', target='c', weight=1)]
a: [Edge(source='a', target='b', weight=1)]
Input neighboring vertex of 'g': f
is 'c' the target? [y/N] n
Please input a vertex on the shortest path between 'c' and the target. The graph is:
[...]
Input neighboring vertex of 'c': d
is 'd' the target? [y/N] n
Please input a vertex on the shortest path between 'd' and the target. The graph is:
[...]
Input neighboring vertex of 'd': e
Found target: e


## A likely story

The binary search we implemented in this post is pretty minimal. In fact, the more interesting part of the work of Emamjomeh-Zadeh et al. is the part where the response to the query can be wrong with some unknown probability.

In this case, there can be many shortest paths that are valid responses to a query, in addition to all the invalid responses. In particular, this rules out the strategy of asking the same query multiple times and taking the majority response. If the error rate is 1/3, and there are two shortest paths to the target, you can get into a situation in which you see three responses equally often and can’t choose which one is the liar.

Instead, the technique Emamjomeh-Zadeh et al. use is based on the Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm (it strikes again!). Each query gives a multiplicative increase (or decrease) on the set of nodes that are consistent targets under the assumption that query response is correct. There are a few extra details and some postprocessing to avoid unlikely outcomes, but that’s the basic idea. Implementing it would be an excellent exercise for readers interested in diving deeper into a recent research paper (or to flex their math muscles).

But even deeper, this model of “query and get advice on how to improve” is a classic  learning model first formally studied by Dana Angluin (my academic grand-advisor). In her model, one wants to design an algorithm to learn a classifier. The allowed queries are membership and equivalence queries. A membership is essentially, “What’s its label of this element?” and an equivalence query has the form, “Is this the right classifier?” If the answer is no, a mislabeled example is provided.

This is different from the usual machine learning assumption, because the learning algorithm gets to construct an example it wants to get more information about, instead of simply relying on a randomly generated subset of data. The goal is to minimize the number of queries before the target hypothesis is learned exactly. And indeed, as we saw in this post, if you have a little extra time to analyze the problem space, you can craft queries that extract quite a lot of information.

Indeed, the model we presented here for binary search on graphs is the natural analogue of an equivalence query for a search problem: instead of a mislabeled counterexample, you get a nudge in the right direction toward the target. Pretty neat!

There are a few directions we could take from here: (1) implement the Multiplicative Weights version of the algorithm, (2) apply this technique to a problem like ranking or clustering, or (3) cover theoretical learning models like membership and equivalence queries in more detail. What interests you?

Until next time!

# A Spectral Analysis of Moore Graphs

For fixed integers $r > 0$, and odd $g$, a Moore graph is an $r$-regular graph of girth $g$ which has the minimum number of vertices $n$ among all such graphs with the same regularity and girth.

(Recall, A the girth of a graph is the length of its shortest cycle, and it’s regular if all its vertices have the same degree)

Problem (Hoffman-Singleton): Find a useful constraint on the relationship between $n$ and $r$ for Moore graphs of girth $5$ and degree $r$.

Note: Excluding trivial Moore graphs with girth $g=3$ and degree $r=2$, there are only two known Moore graphs: (a) the Petersen graph and (b) this crazy graph:

The solution to the problem shows that there are only a few cases left to check.

Solution: It is easy to show that the minimum number of vertices of a Moore graph of girth $5$ and degree $r$ is $1 + r + r(r-1) = r^2 + 1$. Just consider the tree:

This is the tree example for $r = 3$, but the argument should be clear for any $r$ from the branching pattern of the tree: $1 + r + r(r-1)$

Provided $n = r^2 + 1$, we will prove that $r$ must be either $3, 7,$ or $57$. The technique will be to analyze the eigenvalues of a special matrix derived from the Moore graph.

Let $A$ be the adjacency matrix of the supposed Moore graph with these properties. Let $B = A^2 = (b_{i,j})$. Using the girth and regularity we know:

• $b_{i,i} = r$ since each vertex has degree $r$.
• $b_{i,j} = 0$ if $(i,j)$ is an edge of $G$, since any walk of length 2 from $i$ to $j$ would be able to use such an edge and create a cycle of length 3 which is less than the girth.
• $b_{i,j} = 1$ if $(i,j)$ is not an edge, because (using the tree idea above), every two vertices non-adjacent vertices have a unique neighbor in common.

Let $J_n$ be the $n \times n$ matrix of all 1’s and $I_n$ the identity matrix. Then

$\displaystyle B = rI_n + J_n - I_n - A.$

We use this matrix equation to generate two equations whose solutions will restrict $r$. Since $A$ is a real symmetric matrix is has an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors $v_1, \dots, v_n$ with eigenvalues $\lambda_1 , \dots, \lambda_n$. Moreover, by regularity we know one of these vectors is the all 1’s vector, with eigenvalue $r$. Call this $v_1 = (1, \dots, 1), \lambda_1 = r$. By orthogonality of $v_1$ with the other $v_i$, we know that $J_nv_i = 0$. We also know that, since $A$ is an adjacency matrix with zeros on the diagonal, the trace of $A$ is $\sum_i \lambda_i = 0$.

Multiply the matrices in the equation above by any $v_i$, $i > 1$ to get

\displaystyle \begin{aligned}A^2v_i &= rv_i - v_i - Av_i \\ \lambda_i^2v_i &= rv_i - v_i - \lambda_i v_i \end{aligned}

Rearranging and factoring out $v_i$ gives $\lambda_i^2 - \lambda_i - (r+1) = 0$. Let $z = 4r - 3$, then the non-$r$ eigenvalues must be one of the two roots: $\mu_1 = (-1 + \sqrt{z}) / 2$ or $\mu_2 = (-1 - \sqrt{z})/2$.

Say that $\mu_1$ occurs $a$ times and $\mu_2$ occurs $b$ times, then $n = a + b + 1$. So we have the following equations.

\displaystyle \begin{aligned} a + b + 1 &= n \\ r + a \mu_1 + b\mu_2 &= 0 \end{aligned}

From this equation you can easily derive that $\sqrt{z}$ is an integer, and as a consequence $r = (m^2 + 3) / 4$ for some integer $m$. With a tiny bit of extra algebra, this gives

$\displaystyle m(m^3 - 2m - 16(a-b)) = 15$

Implying that $m$ divides $15$, meaning $m \in \{ 1, 3, 5, 15\}$, and as a consequence $r \in \{ 1, 3, 7, 57\}$.

$\square$

Discussion: This is a strikingly clever use of spectral graph theory to answer a question about combinatorics. Spectral graph theory is precisely that, the study of what linear algebra can tell us about graphs. For an deeper dive into spectral graph theory, see the guest post I wrote on With High Probability.

If you allow for even girth, there are a few extra (infinite families of) Moore graphs, see Wikipedia for a list.

With additional techniques, one can also disprove the existence of any Moore graphs that are not among the known ones, with the exception of a possible Moore graph of girth $5$ and degree $57$ on $n = 3250$ vertices. It is unknown whether such a graph exists, but if it does, it is known that

You should go out and find it or prove it doesn’t exist.

Hungry for more applications of linear algebra to combinatorics and computer science? The book Thirty-Three Miniatures is a fantastically entertaining book of linear algebra gems (it’s where I found the proof in this post). The exposition is lucid, and the chapters are short enough to read on my daily train commute.

# Zero Knowledge Proofs for NP

Last time, we saw a specific zero-knowledge proof for graph isomorphism. This introduced us to the concept of an interactive proof, where you have a prover and a verifier sending messages back and forth, and the prover is trying to prove a specific claim to the verifier.

A zero-knowledge proof is a special kind of interactive proof in which the prover has some secret piece of knowledge that makes it very easy to verify a disputed claim is true. The prover’s goal, then, is to convince the verifier (a polynomial-time algorithm) that the claim is true without revealing any knowledge at all about the secret.

In this post we’ll see that, using a bit of cryptography, zero-knowledge proofs capture a much wider class of problems than graph isomorphism. Basically, if you believe that cryptography exists, every problem whose answers can be easily verified have zero-knowledge proofs (i.e., all of the class NP). Here are a bunch of examples. For each I’ll phrase the problem as a question, and then say what sort of data the prover’s secret could be.

• Given a boolean formula, is there an assignment of variables making it true? Secret: a satisfying assignment to the variables.
• Given a set of integers, is there a subset whose sum is zero? Secret: such a subset.
• Given a graph, does it have a 3-coloring? Secret: a valid 3-coloring.
• Given a boolean circuit, can it produce a specific output? Secret: a choice of inputs that produces the output.

The common link among all of these problems is that they are NP-hard (graph isomorphism isn’t known to be NP-hard). For us this means two things: (1) we think these problems are actually hard, so the verifier can’t solve them, and (2) if you show that one of them has a zero-knowledge proof, then they all have zero-knowledge proofs.

We’re going to describe and implement a zero-knowledge proof for graph 3-colorability, and in the next post we’ll dive into the theoretical definitions and talk about the proof that the scheme we present is zero-knowledge. As usual, all of the code used in making this post is available in a repository on this blog’s Github page.

## One-way permutations

In a recent program gallery post we introduced the Blum-Blum-Shub pseudorandom generator. A pseudorandom generator is simply an algorithm that takes as input a short random string of length $s$ and produces as output a longer string, say, of length $3s$. This output string should not be random, but rather “indistinguishable” from random in a sense we’ll make clear next time. The underlying function for this generator is the “modular squaring” function $x \mapsto x^2 \mod M$, for some cleverly chosen $M$. The $M$ is chosen in such a way that makes this mapping a permutation. So this function is more than just a pseudorandom generator, it’s a one-way permutation.

If you have a primality-checking algorithm on hand (we do), then preparing the Blum-Blum-Shub algorithm is only about 15 lines of code.

def goodPrime(p):
return p % 4 == 3 and probablyPrime(p, accuracy=100)

def findGoodPrime(numBits=512):
candidate = 1

while not goodPrime(candidate):
candidate = random.getrandbits(numBits)

return candidate

def makeModulus(numBits=512):
return findGoodPrime(numBits) * findGoodPrime(numBits)

def blum_blum_shub(modulusLength=512):
modulus = makeModulus(numBits=modulusLength)

def f(inputInt):
return pow(inputInt, 2, modulus)

return f


The interested reader should check out the proof gallery post for more details about this generator. For us, having a one-way permutation is the important part (and we’re going to defer the formal definition of “one-way” until next time, just think “hard to get inputs from outputs”).

The other concept we need, which is related to a one-way permutation, is the notion of a hardcore predicate. Let $G(x)$ be a one-way permutation, and let $f(x) = b$ be a function that produces a single bit from a string. We say that $f$ is a hardcore predicate for $G$ if you can’t reliably compute $f(x)$ when given only $G(x)$.

Hardcore predicates are important because there are many one-way functions for which, when given the output, you can guess part of the input very reliably, but not the rest (e.g., if $g$ is a one-way function, $(x, y) \mapsto (x, g(y))$ is also one-way, but the $x$ part is trivially guessable). So a hardcore predicate formally measures, when given the output of a one-way function, what information derived from the input is hard to compute.

In the case of Blum-Blum-Shub, one hardcore predicate is simply the parity of the input bits.

def parity(n):
return sum(int(x) for x in bin(n)[2:]) % 2


## Bit Commitment Schemes

A core idea that will makes zero-knowledge proofs work for NP is the ability for the prover to publicly “commit” to a choice, and later reveal that choice in a way that makes it infeasible to fake their commitment. This will involve not just the commitment to a single bit of information, but also the transmission of auxiliary data that is provably infeasible to fake.

Our pair of one-way permutation $G$ and hardcore predicate $f$ comes in very handy. Let’s say I want to commit to a bit $b \in \{ 0,1 \}$. Let’s fix a security parameter that will measure how hard it is to change my commitment post-hoc, say $n = 512$. My process for committing is to draw a random string $x$ of length $n$, and send you the pair $(G(x), f(x) \oplus b)$, where $\oplus$ is the XOR operator on two bits.

The guarantee of a one-way permutation with a hardcore predicate is that if you only see $G(x)$, you can’t guess $f(x)$ with any reasonable edge over random guessing. Moreover, if you fix a bit $b$, and take an unpredictably random bit $y$, the XOR $b \oplus y$ is also unpredictably random. In other words, if $f(x)$ is hardcore, then so is $x \mapsto f(x) \oplus b$ for a fixed bit $b$. Finally, to reveal my commitment, I just send the string $x$ and let you independently compute $(G(x), f(x) \oplus b)$. Since $G$ is a permutation, that $x$ is the only $x$ that could have produced the commitment I sent you earlier.

Here’s a Python implementation of this scheme. We start with a generic base class for a commitment scheme.

class CommitmentScheme(object):
def __init__(self, oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate, securityParameter):
'''
oneWayPermutation: int -> int
hardcorePredicate: int -> {0, 1}
'''
self.oneWayPermutation = oneWayPermutation
self.hardcorePredicate = hardcorePredicate
self.securityParameter = securityParameter

# a random string of length self.securityParameter used only once per commitment
self.secret = self.generateSecret()

def generateSecret(self):
raise NotImplemented

def commit(self, x):
raise NotImplemented

def reveal(self):
return self.secret


Note that the “reveal” step is always simply to reveal the secret. Here’s the implementation subclass. We should also note that the security string should be chosen at random anew for every bit you wish to commit to. In this post we won’t reuse CommitmentScheme objects anyway.

class BBSBitCommitmentScheme(CommitmentScheme):
def generateSecret(self):
# the secret is a random quadratic residue
self.secret = self.oneWayPermutation(random.getrandbits(self.securityParameter))
return self.secret

def commit(self, bit):
unguessableBit = self.hardcorePredicate(self.secret)
return (
self.oneWayPermutation(self.secret),
unguessableBit ^ bit,  # python xor
)


One important detail is that the Blum-Blum-Shub one-way permutation is only a permutation when restricted to quadratic residues. As such, we generate our secret by shooting a random string through the one-way permutation to get a random residue. In fact this produces a uniform random residue, since the Blum-Blum-Shub modulus is chosen in such a way that ensures every residue has exactly four square roots.

Here’s code to check the verification is correct.

class BBSBitCommitmentVerifier(object):
def __init__(self, oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate):
self.oneWayPermutation = oneWayPermutation
self.hardcorePredicate = hardcorePredicate

def verify(self, securityString, claimedCommitment):
trueBit = self.decode(securityString, claimedCommitment)
unguessableBit = self.hardcorePredicate(securityString)  # wasteful, whatever
return claimedCommitment == (
self.oneWayPermutation(securityString),
unguessableBit ^ trueBit,  # python xor
)

def decode(self, securityString, claimedCommitment):
unguessableBit = self.hardcorePredicate(securityString)
return claimedCommitment[1] ^ unguessableBit


and an example of using it

if __name__ == "__main__":
import blum_blum_shub
securityParameter = 10
oneWayPerm = blum_blum_shub.blum_blum_shub(securityParameter)
hardcorePred = blum_blum_shub.parity

print('Bit commitment')
scheme = BBSBitCommitmentScheme(oneWayPerm, hardcorePred, securityParameter)
verifier = BBSBitCommitmentVerifier(oneWayPerm, hardcorePred)

for _ in range(10):
bit = random.choice([0, 1])
commitment = scheme.commit(bit)
secret = scheme.reveal()
trueBit = verifier.decode(secret, commitment)
valid = verifier.verify(secret, commitment)

print('{} == {}? {}; {} {}'.format(bit, trueBit, valid, secret, commitment))


Example output:

1 == 1? True; 524 (5685, 0)
1 == 1? True; 149 (22201, 1)
1 == 1? True; 476 (34511, 1)
1 == 1? True; 927 (14243, 1)
1 == 1? True; 608 (23947, 0)
0 == 0? True; 964 (7384, 1)
0 == 0? True; 373 (23890, 0)
0 == 0? True; 620 (270, 1)
1 == 1? True; 926 (12390, 0)
0 == 0? True; 708 (1895, 0)


As an exercise, write a program to verify that no other input to the Blum-Blum-Shub one-way permutation gives a valid verification. Test it on a small security parameter like $n=10$.

It’s also important to point out that the verifier needs to do some additional validation that we left out. For example, how does the verifier know that the revealed secret actually is a quadratic residue? In fact, detecting quadratic residues is believed to be hard! To get around this, we could change the commitment scheme reveal step to reveal the random string that was used as input to the permutation to get the residue (cf. BBSCommitmentScheme.generateSecret for the random string that needs to be saved/revealed). Then the verifier could generate the residue in the same way. As an exercise, upgrade the bit commitment an verifier classes to reflect this.

In order to get a zero-knowledge proof for 3-coloring, we need to be able to commit to one of three colors, which requires two bits. So let’s go overkill and write a generic integer commitment scheme. It’s simple enough: specify a bound on the size of the integers, and then do an independent bit commitment for every bit.

class BBSIntCommitmentScheme(CommitmentScheme):
def __init__(self, numBits, oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate, securityParameter=512):
'''
A commitment scheme for integers of a prespecified length numBits. Applies the
Blum-Blum-Shub bit commitment scheme to each bit independently.
'''
self.schemes = [BBSBitCommitmentScheme(oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate, securityParameter)
for _ in range(numBits)]
super().__init__(oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate, securityParameter)

def generateSecret(self):
self.secret = [x.secret for x in self.schemes]
return self.secret

def commit(self, integer):
# first pad bits to desired length
integer = bin(integer)[2:].zfill(len(self.schemes))
bits = [int(bit) for bit in integer]
return [scheme.commit(bit) for scheme, bit in zip(self.schemes, bits)]


And the corresponding verifier

class BBSIntCommitmentVerifier(object):
def __init__(self, numBits, oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate):
self.verifiers = [BBSBitCommitmentVerifier(oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate)
for _ in range(numBits)]

def decodeBits(self, secrets, bitCommitments):
return [v.decode(secret, commitment) for (v, secret, commitment) in
zip(self.verifiers, secrets, bitCommitments)]

def verify(self, secrets, bitCommitments):
return all(
bitVerifier.verify(secret, commitment)
for (bitVerifier, secret, commitment) in
zip(self.verifiers, secrets, bitCommitments)
)

def decode(self, secrets, bitCommitments):
decodedBits = self.decodeBits(secrets, bitCommitments)
return int(''.join(str(bit) for bit in decodedBits))


A sample usage:

if __name__ == "__main__":
import blum_blum_shub
securityParameter = 10
oneWayPerm = blum_blum_shub.blum_blum_shub(securityParameter)
hardcorePred = blum_blum_shub.parity

print('Int commitment')
scheme = BBSIntCommitmentScheme(10, oneWayPerm, hardcorePred)
verifier = BBSIntCommitmentVerifier(10, oneWayPerm, hardcorePred)
choices = list(range(1024))
for _ in range(10):
theInt = random.choice(choices)
commitments = scheme.commit(theInt)
secrets = scheme.reveal()
trueInt = verifier.decode(secrets, commitments)
valid = verifier.verify(secrets, commitments)

print('{} == {}? {}; {} {}'.format(theInt, trueInt, valid, secrets, commitments))


And a sample output:

527 == 527? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 0), (342, 1), (54363, 1), (63975, 0), (5426, 0), (9124, 1), (23973, 0), (44832, 0), (33044, 0), (68501, 0)]
67 == 67? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 1), (342, 1), (54363, 1), (63975, 1), (5426, 0), (9124, 1), (23973, 1), (44832, 1), (33044, 0), (68501, 0)]
729 == 729? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 0), (342, 1), (54363, 0), (63975, 1), (5426, 0), (9124, 0), (23973, 0), (44832, 1), (33044, 1), (68501, 0)]
441 == 441? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 1), (342, 0), (54363, 0), (63975, 0), (5426, 1), (9124, 0), (23973, 0), (44832, 1), (33044, 1), (68501, 0)]
614 == 614? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 0), (342, 1), (54363, 1), (63975, 1), (5426, 1), (9124, 1), (23973, 1), (44832, 0), (33044, 0), (68501, 1)]
696 == 696? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 0), (342, 1), (54363, 0), (63975, 0), (5426, 1), (9124, 0), (23973, 0), (44832, 1), (33044, 1), (68501, 1)]
974 == 974? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 0), (342, 0), (54363, 0), (63975, 1), (5426, 0), (9124, 1), (23973, 0), (44832, 0), (33044, 0), (68501, 1)]
184 == 184? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 1), (342, 1), (54363, 0), (63975, 0), (5426, 1), (9124, 0), (23973, 0), (44832, 1), (33044, 1), (68501, 1)]
136 == 136? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 1), (342, 1), (54363, 0), (63975, 0), (5426, 0), (9124, 1), (23973, 0), (44832, 1), (33044, 1), (68501, 1)]
632 == 632? True; [25461, 56722, 25739, 2268, 1185, 18226, 46375, 8907, 54979, 23095] [(29616, 0), (342, 1), (54363, 1), (63975, 1), (5426, 1), (9124, 0), (23973, 0), (44832, 1), (33044, 1), (68501, 1)]


Before we move on, we should note that this integer commitment scheme “blows up” the secret by quite a bit. If you have a security parameter $s$ and an integer with $n$ bits, then the commitment uses roughly $sn$ bits. A more efficient method would be to simply use a good public-key encryption scheme, and then reveal the secret key used to encrypt the message. While we implemented such schemes previously on this blog, I thought it would be more fun to do something new.

## A zero-knowledge proof for 3-coloring

First, a high-level description of the protocol. The setup: the prover has a graph $G$ with $n$ vertices $V$ and $m$ edges $E$, and also has a secret 3-coloring of the vertices $\varphi: V \to \{ 0, 1, 2 \}$. Recall, a 3-coloring is just an assignment of colors to vertices (in this case the colors are 0,1,2) so that no two adjacent vertices have the same color.

So the prover has a coloring $\varphi$ to be kept secret, but wants to prove that $G$ is 3-colorable. The idea is for the verifier to pick a random edge $(u,v)$, and have the prover reveal the colors of $u$ and $v$. However, if we run this protocol only once, there’s nothing to stop the prover from just lying and picking two distinct colors. If we allow the verifier to run the protocol many times, and the prover actually reveals the colors from their secret coloring, then after roughly $|V|$ rounds the verifier will know the entire coloring. Each step reveals more knowledge.

We can fix this with two modifications.

1. The prover first publicly commits to the coloring using a commitment scheme. Then when the verifier asks for the colors of the two vertices of a random edge, he can rest assured that the prover fixed a coloring that does not depend on the verifier’s choice of edge.
2. The prover doesn’t reveal colors from their secret coloring, but rather from a random permutation of the secret coloring. This way, when the verifier sees colors, they’re equally likely to see any two colors, and all the verifier will know is that those two colors are different.

So the scheme is: prover commits to a random permutation of the true coloring and sends it to the verifier; the verifier asks for the true colors of a given edge; the prover provides those colors and the secrets to their commitment scheme so the verifier can check.

The key point is that now the verifier has to commit to a coloring, and if the coloring isn’t a proper 3-coloring the verifier has a reasonable chance of picking an improperly colored edge (a one-in-$|E|$ chance, which is at least $1/|V|^2$). On the other hand, if the coloring is proper, then the verifier will always query a properly colored edge, and it’s zero-knowledge because the verifier is equally likely to see every pair of colors. So the verifier will always accept, but won’t know anything more than that the edge it chose is properly colored. Repeating this $|V|^2$-ish times, with high probability it’ll have queried every edge and be certain the coloring is legitimate.

Let’s implement this scheme. First the data types. As in the previous post, graphs are represented by edge lists, and a coloring is represented by a dictionary mapping a vertex to 0, 1, or 2 (the “colors”).

# a graph is a list of edges, and for simplicity we'll say
# every vertex shows up in some edge
exampleGraph = [
(1, 2),
(1, 4),
(1, 3),
(2, 5),
(2, 5),
(3, 6),
(5, 6)
]

exampleColoring = {
1: 0,
2: 1,
3: 2,
4: 1,
5: 2,
6: 0,
}


Next, the Prover class that implements that half of the protocol. We store a list of integer commitment schemes for each vertex whose color we need to commit to, and send out those commitments.

class Prover(object):
def __init__(self, graph, coloring, oneWayPermutation=ONE_WAY_PERMUTATION, hardcorePredicate=HARDCORE_PREDICATE):
self.graph = [tuple(sorted(e)) for e in graph]
self.coloring = coloring
self.vertices = list(range(1, numVertices(graph) + 1))
self.oneWayPermutation = oneWayPermutation
self.hardcorePredicate = hardcorePredicate
self.vertexToScheme = None

def commitToColoring(self):
self.vertexToScheme = {
v: commitment.BBSIntCommitmentScheme(
2, self.oneWayPermutation, self.hardcorePredicate
) for v in self.vertices
}

permutation = randomPermutation(3)
permutedColoring = {
v: permutation[self.coloring[v]] for v in self.vertices
}

return {v: s.commit(permutedColoring[v])
for (v, s) in self.vertexToScheme.items()}

def revealColors(self, u, v):
u, v = min(u, v), max(u, v)
if not (u, v) in self.graph:
raise Exception('Must query an edge!')

return (
self.vertexToScheme[u].reveal(),
self.vertexToScheme[v].reveal(),
)


In commitToColoring we randomly permute the underlying colors, and then compose that permutation with the secret coloring, committing to each resulting color independently. In revealColors we reveal only those colors for a queried edge. Note that we don’t actually need to store the permuted coloring, because it’s implicitly stored in the commitments.

It’s crucial that we reject any query that doesn’t correspond to an edge. If we don’t reject such queries then the verifier can break the protocol! In particular, by querying non-edges you can determine which pairs of nodes have the same color in the secret coloring. You can then chain these together to partition the nodes into color classes, and so color the graph. (After seeing the Verifier class below, implement this attack as an exercise).

Here’s the corresponding Verifier:

class Verifier(object):
def __init__(self, graph, oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate):
self.graph = [tuple(sorted(e)) for e in graph]
self.oneWayPermutation = oneWayPermutation
self.hardcorePredicate = hardcorePredicate
self.committedColoring = None
self.verifier = commitment.BBSIntCommitmentVerifier(2, oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate)

def chooseEdge(self, committedColoring):
self.committedColoring = committedColoring
self.chosenEdge = random.choice(self.graph)
return self.chosenEdge

def accepts(self, revealed):
revealedColors = []

for (w, bitSecrets) in zip(self.chosenEdge, revealed):
trueColor = self.verifier.decode(bitSecrets, self.committedColoring[w])
revealedColors.append(trueColor)
if not self.verifier.verify(bitSecrets, self.committedColoring[w]):
return False

return revealedColors[0] != revealedColors[1]


As expected, in the acceptance step the verifier decodes the true color of the edge it queried, and accepts if and only if the commitment was valid and the edge is properly colored.

Here’s the whole protocol, which is syntactically very similar to the one for graph isomorphism.

def runProtocol(G, coloring, securityParameter=512):
oneWayPermutation = blum_blum_shub.blum_blum_shub(securityParameter)
hardcorePredicate = blum_blum_shub.parity

prover = Prover(G, coloring, oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate)
verifier = Verifier(G, oneWayPermutation, hardcorePredicate)

committedColoring = prover.commitToColoring()
chosenEdge = verifier.chooseEdge(committedColoring)

revealed = prover.revealColors(*chosenEdge)
revealedColors = (
verifier.verifier.decode(revealed[0], committedColoring[chosenEdge[0]]),
verifier.verifier.decode(revealed[1], committedColoring[chosenEdge[1]]),
)
isValid = verifier.accepts(revealed)

print("{} != {} and commitment is valid? {}".format(
revealedColors[0], revealedColors[1], isValid
))

return isValid


And an example of running it

if __name__ == "__main__":
for _ in range(30):
runProtocol(exampleGraph, exampleColoring, securityParameter=10)


Here’s the output

0 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 1 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 1 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 1 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 1 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 1 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 1 and commitment is valid? True
2 != 1 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 0 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
1 != 2 and commitment is valid? True
0 != 1 and commitment is valid? True


So while we haven’t proved it rigorously, we’ve seen the zero-knowledge proof for graph 3-coloring. This automatically gives us a zero-knowledge proof for all of NP, because given any NP problem you can just convert it to the equivalent 3-coloring problem and solve that. Of course, the blowup required to convert a random NP problem to 3-coloring can be polynomially large, which makes it unsuitable for practice. But the point is that this gives us a theoretical justification for which problems have zero-knowledge proofs in principle. Now that we’ve established that you can go about trying to find the most efficient protocol for your favorite problem.

## Anticipatory notes

When we covered graph isomorphism last time, we said that a simulator could, without participating in the zero-knowledge protocol or knowing the secret isomorphism, produce a transcript that was drawn from the same distribution of messages as the protocol produced. That was all that it needed to be “zero-knowledge,” because anything the verifier could do with its protocol transcript, the simulator could do too.

We can do exactly the same thing for 3-coloring, exploiting the same “reverse order” trick where the simulator picks the random edge first, then chooses the color commitment post-hoc.

Unfortunately, both there and here I’m short-changing you, dear reader. The elephant in the room is that our naive simulator assumes the verifier is playing by the rules! If you want to define security, you have to define it against a verifier who breaks the protocol in an arbitrary way. For example, the simulator should be able to produce an equivalent transcript even if the verifier deterministically picks an edge, or tries to pick a non-edge, or tries to send gibberish. It takes a lot more work to prove security against an arbitrary verifier, but the basic setup is that the simulator can no longer make choices for the verifier, but rather has to invoke the verifier subroutine as a black box. (To compensate, the requirements on the simulator are relaxed quite a bit; more on that next time)

Because an implementation of such a scheme would involve a lot of validation, we’re going to defer the discussion to next time. We also need to be more specific about the different kinds of zero-knowledge, since we won’t be able to achieve perfect zero-knowledge with the simulator drawing from an identical distribution, but rather a computationally indistinguishable distribution.

We’ll define all this rigorously next time, and discuss the known theoretical implications and limitations. Next time will be cuffs-off theory, baby!

Until then!

# Zero Knowledge Proofs — A Primer

In this post we’ll get a strong taste for zero knowledge proofs by exploring the graph isomorphism problem in detail. In the next post, we’ll see how this relates to cryptography and the bigger picture. The goal of this post is to get a strong understanding of the terms “prover,” “verifier,” and “simulator,” and “zero knowledge” in the context of a specific zero-knowledge proof. Then next time we’ll see how the same concepts (though not the same proof) generalizes to a cryptographically interesting setting.

## Graph isomorphism

Let’s start with an extended example. We are given two graphs $G_1, G_2$, and we’d like to know whether they’re isomorphic, meaning they’re the same graph, but “drawn” different ways.

The problem of telling if two graphs are isomorphic seems hard. The pictures above, which are all different drawings of the same graph (or are they?), should give you pause if you thought it was easy.

To add a tiny bit of formalism, a graph $G$ is a list of edges, and each edge $(u,v)$ is a pair of integers between 1 and the total number of vertices of the graph, say $n$. Using this representation, an isomorphism between $G_1$ and $G_2$ is a permutation $\pi$ of the numbers $\{1, 2, \dots, n \}$ with the property that $(i,j)$ is an edge in $G_1$ if and only if $(\pi(i), \pi(j))$ is an edge of $G_2$. You swap around the labels on the vertices, and that’s how you get from one graph to another isomorphic one.

Given two arbitrary graphs as input on a large number of vertices $n$, nobody knows of an efficient—i.e., polynomial time in $n$—algorithm that can always decide whether the input graphs are isomorphic. Even if you promise me that the inputs are isomorphic, nobody knows of an algorithm that could construct an isomorphism. (If you think about it, such an algorithm could be used to solve the decision problem!)

## A game

Now let’s play a game. In this game, we’re given two enormous graphs on a billion nodes. I claim they’re isomorphic, and I want to prove it to you. However, my life’s fortune is locked behind these particular graphs (somehow), and if you actually had an isomorphism between these two graphs you could use it to steal all my money. But I still want to convince you that I do, in fact, own all of this money, because we’re about to start a business and you need to know I’m not broke.

Is there a way for me to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that these two graphs are indeed isomorphic? And moreover, could I do so without you gaining access to my secret isomorphism? It would be even better if I could guarantee you learn nothing about my isomorphism or any isomorphism, because even the slightest chance that you can steal my money is out of the question.

Zero knowledge proofs have exactly those properties, and here’s a zero knowledge proof for graph isomorphism. For the record, $G_1$ and $G_2$ are public knowledge, (common inputs to our protocol for the sake of tracking runtime), and the protocol itself is common knowledge. However, I have an isomorphism $f: G_1 \to G_2$ that you don’t know.

Step 1: I will start by picking one of my two graphs, say $G_1$, mixing up the vertices, and sending you the resulting graph. In other words, I send you a graph $H$ which is chosen uniformly at random from all isomorphic copies of $G_1$. I will save the permutation $\pi$ that I used to generate $H$ for later use.

Step 2: You receive a graph $H$ which you save for later, and then you randomly pick an integer $t$ which is either 1 or 2, with equal probability on each. The number $t$ corresponds to your challenge for me to prove $H$ is isomorphic to $G_1$ or $G_2$. You send me back $t$, with the expectation that I will provide you with an isomorphism between $H$ and $G_t$.

Step 3: Indeed, I faithfully provide you such an isomorphism. If I you send me $t=1$, I’ll give you back $\pi^{-1} : H \to G_1$, and otherwise I’ll give you back $f \circ \pi^{-1}: H \to G_2$. Because composing a fixed permutation with a uniformly random permutation is again a uniformly random permutation, in either case I’m sending you a uniformly random permutation.

Step 4: You receive a permutation $g$, and you can use it to verify that $H$ is isomorphic to $G_t$. If the permutation I sent you doesn’t work, you’ll reject my claim, and if it does, you’ll accept my claim.

Before we analyze, here’s some Python code that implements the above scheme. You can find the full, working example in a repository on this blog’s Github page.

First, a few helper functions for generating random permutations (and turning their list-of-zero-based-indices form into a function-of-positive-integers form)

import random

def randomPermutation(n):
L = list(range(n))
random.shuffle(L)
return L

def makePermutationFunction(L):
return lambda i: L[i - 1] + 1

def makeInversePermutationFunction(L):
return lambda i: 1 + L.index(i - 1)

def applyIsomorphism(G, f):
return [(f(i), f(j)) for (i, j) in G]


Here’s a class for the Prover, the one who knows the isomorphism and wants to prove it while keeping the isomorphism secret:

class Prover(object):
def __init__(self, G1, G2, isomorphism):
'''
isomomorphism is a list of integers representing
an isomoprhism from G1 to G2.
'''
self.G1 = G1
self.G2 = G2
self.n = numVertices(G1)
assert self.n == numVertices(G2)

self.isomorphism = isomorphism
self.state = None

def sendIsomorphicCopy(self):
isomorphism = randomPermutation(self.n)
pi = makePermutationFunction(isomorphism)

H = applyIsomorphism(self.G1, pi)

self.state = isomorphism
return H

def proveIsomorphicTo(self, graphChoice):
randomIsomorphism = self.state
piInverse = makeInversePermutationFunction(randomIsomorphism)

if graphChoice == 1:
return piInverse
else:
f = makePermutationFunction(self.isomorphism)
return lambda i: f(piInverse(i))


The prover has two methods, one for each round of the protocol. The first creates an isomorphic copy of $G_1$, and the second receives the challenge and produces the requested isomorphism.

And here’s the corresponding class for the verifier

class Verifier(object):
def __init__(self, G1, G2):
self.G1 = G1
self.G2 = G2
self.n = numVertices(G1)
assert self.n == numVertices(G2)

def chooseGraph(self, H):
choice = random.choice([1, 2])
self.state = H, choice
return choice

def accepts(self, isomorphism):
'''
Return True if and only if the given isomorphism
is a valid isomorphism between the randomly
chosen graph in the first step, and the H presented
by the Prover.
'''
H, choice = self.state
graphToCheck = [self.G1, self.G2][choice - 1]
f = isomorphism

isValidIsomorphism = (graphToCheck == applyIsomorphism(H, f))
return isValidIsomorphism


Then the protocol is as follows:

def runProtocol(G1, G2, isomorphism):
p = Prover(G1, G2, isomorphism)
v = Verifier(G1, G2)

H = p.sendIsomorphicCopy()
choice = v.chooseGraph(H)
witnessIsomorphism = p.proveIsomorphicTo(choice)

return v.accepts(witnessIsomorphism)


Analysis: Let’s suppose for a moment that everyone is honestly following the rules, and that $G_1, G_2$ are truly isomorphic. Then you’ll always accept my claim, because I can always provide you with an isomorphism. Now let’s suppose that, actually I’m lying, the two graphs aren’t isomorphic, and I’m trying to fool you into thinking they are. What’s the probability that you’ll rightfully reject my claim?

Well, regardless of what I do, I’m sending you a graph $H$ and you get to make a random choice of $t = 1, 2$ that I can’t control. If $H$ is only actually isomorphic to either $G_1$ or $G_2$ but not both, then so long as you make your choice uniformly at random, half of the time I won’t be able to produce a valid isomorphism and you’ll reject. And unless you can actually tell which graph $H$ is isomorphic to—an open problem, but let’s say you can’t—then probability 1/2 is the best you can do.

Maybe the probability 1/2 is a bit unsatisfying, but remember that we can amplify this probability by repeating the protocol over and over again. So if you want to be sure I didn’t cheat and get lucky to within a probability of one-in-one-trillion, you only need to repeat the protocol 30 times. To be surer than the chance of picking a specific atom at random from all atoms in the universe, only about 400 times.

If you want to feel small, think of the number of atoms in the universe. If you want to feel big, think of its logarithm.

Here’s the code that repeats the protocol for assurance.

def convinceBeyondDoubt(G1, G2, isomorphism, errorTolerance=1e-20):
probabilityFooled = 1

while probabilityFooled &gt; errorTolerance:
result = runProtocol(G1, G2, isomorphism)
assert result
probabilityFooled *= 0.5
print(probabilityFooled)


Running it, we see it succeeds

\$ python graph-isomorphism.py
0.5
0.25
0.125
0.0625
0.03125
...
&amp;lt;SNIP&amp;gt;
...
1.3552527156068805e-20
6.776263578034403e-21


So it’s clear that this protocol is convincing.

But how can we be sure that there’s no leakage of knowledge in the protocol? What does “leakage” even mean? That’s where this topic is the most difficult to nail down rigorously, in part because there are at least three a priori different definitions! The idea we want to capture is that anything that you can efficiently compute after the protocol finishes (i.e., you have the content of the messages sent to you by the prover) you could have computed efficiently given only the two graphs $G_1, G_2$, and the claim that they are isomorphic.

Another way to say it is that you may go through the verification process and feel happy and confident that the two graphs are isomorphic. But because it’s a zero-knowledge proof, you can’t do anything with that information more than you could have done if you just took the assertion on blind faith. I’m confident there’s a joke about religion lurking here somewhere, but I’ll just trust it’s funny and move on.

In the next post we’ll expand on this “leakage” notion, but before we get there it should be clear that the graph isomorphism protocol will have the strongest possible “no-leakage” property we can come up with. Indeed, in the first round the prover sends a uniform random isomorphic copy of $G_1$ to the verifier, but the verifier can compute such an isomorphism already without the help of the prover. The verifier can’t necessarily find the isomorphism that the prover used in retrospect, because the verifier can’t solve graph isomorphism. Instead, the point is that the probability space of “$G_1$ paired with an $H$ made by the prover” and the probability space of “$G_1$ paired with $H$ as made by the verifier” are equal. No information was leaked by the prover.

For the second round, again the permutation $\pi$ used by the prover to generate $H$ is uniformly random. Since composing a fixed permutation with a uniform random permutation also results in a uniform random permutation, the second message sent by the prover is uniformly random, and so again the verifier could have constructed a similarly random permutation alone.

Let’s make this explicit with a small program. We have the honest protocol from before, but now I’m returning the set of messages sent by the prover, which the verifier can use for additional computation.

def messagesFromProtocol(G1, G2, isomorphism):
p = Prover(G1, G2, isomorphism)
v = Verifier(G1, G2)

H = p.sendIsomorphicCopy()
choice = v.chooseGraph(H)
witnessIsomorphism = p.proveIsomorphicTo(choice)

return [H, choice, witnessIsomorphism]


To say that the protocol is zero-knowledge (again, this is still colloquial) is to say that anything that the verifier could compute, given as input the return value of this function along with $G_1, G_2$ and the claim that they’re isomorphic, the verifier could also compute given only $G_1, G_2$ and the claim that $G_1, G_2$ are isomorphic.

It’s easy to prove this, and we’ll do so with a python function called simulateProtocol.

def simulateProtocol(G1, G2):
# Construct data drawn from the same distribution as what is
# returned by messagesFromProtocol
choice = random.choice([1, 2])
G = [G1, G2][choice - 1]
n = numVertices(G)

isomorphism = randomPermutation(n)
pi = makePermutationFunction(isomorphism)
H = applyIsomorphism(G, pi)

return H, choice, pi


The claim is that the distribution of outputs to messagesFromProtocol and simulateProtocol are equal. But simulateProtocol will work regardless of whether $G_1, G_2$ are isomorphic. Of course, it’s not convincing to the verifier because the simulating function made the choices in the wrong order, choosing the graph index before making $H$. But the distribution that results is the same either way.

So if you were to use the actual Prover/Verifier protocol outputs as input to another algorithm (say, one which tries to compute an isomorphism of $G_1 \to G_2$), you might as well use the output of your simulator instead. You’d have no information beyond hard-coding the assumption that $G_1, G_2$ are isomorphic into your program. Which, as I mentioned earlier, is no help at all.

In this post we covered one detailed example of a zero-knowledge proof. Next time we’ll broaden our view and see the more general power of zero-knowledge (that it captures all of NP), and see some specific cryptographic applications. Keep in mind the preceding discussion, because we’re going to re-use the terms “prover,” “verifier,” and “simulator” to mean roughly the same things as the classes Prover, Verifier and the function simulateProtocol.

Until then!