# Encoding Schemes in FHE

In cryptography, we need a distinction between a cleartext and a plaintext. A cleartext is a message in its natural form. A plaintext is a cleartext that is represented in a specific way to prepare it for encryption in a specific scheme. The process of taking a cleartext and turning it into a plaintext is called encoding, and the reverse is called decoding.

In homomorphic encryption, the distinction matters. Cleartexts are generally all integers, though the bit width of allowed integers can be restricted (e.g., 4-bit integers). On the other hand, each homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme has its own special process for encoding and decoding, and since HEIR hopes to support all HE schemes, I set about cataloguing the different encoding schemes. This article is my notes on what they are.

If you’re not familiar with the terms Learning With Errors LWE and and its ring variant RLWE, then you may want to read up on those Wikipedia pages first. These problems are fundamental to most FHE schemes.

## Bit field encoding for LWE

A bit field encoding simply places the bits of a small integer cleartext within a larger integer plaintext. An example might be a 3-bit integer cleartext placed in the top-most bits of a 32-bit integer plaintext. This is necessary because operations on FHE ciphertexts accumulate noise, which pollutes the lower-order bits of the corresponding plaintext (BGV is a special case that inverts this, see below).

Many papers in the literature will describe “placing in the top-most bits” as “applying a scaling factor,” which essentially means pick a power of 2 $\Delta$ and encode an integer $x$ as $\Delta x$. However, by using a scaling factor it’s not immediately clear if all of the top-most bits of the plaintext are safe to use.

To wit, the CGGI (aka TFHE) scheme has a slightly more specific encoding because it requires the topmost bit to be zero in order to use its fancy programmable bootstrapping feature. Don’t worry if you don’t know what it means, but just know that in this scheme the top-most bit is set aside.

This encoding is hence most generally described by specifying a starting bit and a bit width for the location of the cleartext in a plaintext integer. The code would look like

plaintext = message << (plaintext_bit_width - starting_bit - cleartext_bit_width)


There are additional steps that come into play when one wants to encode a decimal value in LWE, which can be done with fixed point representations.

As mentioned above, the main HE scheme that uses bit field LWE encodings is CGGI, but all the schemes use this encoding as part of their encoding because all schemes need to ensure there is space for noise growth during FHE operations.

## Coefficient encoding for RLWE

One of the main benefits of RLWE-based FHE schemes is that you can pack lots of cleartexts into one plaintext. For this and all the other RLWE-based sections, the cleartext space is something like $(\mathbb{Z}/3\mathbb{Z})^{1024}$, vectors of small integers of some dimension. Many folks in the FHE world call $p$ the modulus of the cleartexts. And the plaintext space is something like $(\mathbb{Z}/2^{32}\mathbb{Z})[x] / (x^{1024} + 1)$, i.e., polynomials with large integer coefficients and a polynomial degree matching the cleartext space dimension. Many people call $q$ the coefficient modulus of the plaintext space.

In the coefficient encoding for RLWE, the bit-field encoding is applied to each input, and they are interpreted as coefficients of the polynomial.

This encoding scheme is also used in CGGI, in order to encrypt a lookup table as a polynomial for use in programmable bootstrapping. But it can also be used (though it is rarely used) in the BGV and BFV schemes, and rarely because both of those schemes use the polynomial multiplication to have semantic meaning. When you encode RLWE with the coefficient encoding, polynomial multiplication corresponds to a convolution of the underlying cleartexts, when most of the time those schemes prefer that multiplication corresponds to some kind of point-wise multiplication. The next encoding will handle that exactly.

## Evaluation encoding for RLWE

The evaluation encoding borrows ideas from the Discrete Fourier Transform literature. See this post for a little bit more about why the DFT and polynomial multiplication are related.

The evaluation encoding encodes a vector $(v_1, \dots, v_N)$ by interpreting it as the output value of a polynomial $p(x)$ at some implicitly determined, but fixed points. These points are usually the roots of unity of $x^N + 1$ in the ring $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ (recall, the coefficients of the polynomial ring), and one computes this by picking $q$ in such a way that guarantees the multiplicative group $(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^\times$ has a generator, which plays the analogous role of a $2N$-th root of unity that you would normally see in the complex numbers.

Once you have the root of unity, you can convert from the evaluation form to a coefficient form (which many schemes need for the encryption step) via an inverse number-theoretic transform (INTT). And then, of course, one must scale the coefficients using the bit field encoding to give room for noise. The coefficient form here is considered the “encoded” version of the cleartext vector.

Aside: one can perform the bit field encoding step before or after the INTT, since the bitfield encoding is equivalent to multiplying by a constant, and scaling a polynomial by a constant is equivalent to scaling its point evaluations by the same constant. Polynomial evaluation is a linear function of the coefficients.

The evaluation encoding is the most commonly used encoding used for both the BGV and BFV schemes. And then after encryption is done, one usually NTT’s back to the evaluation representation so that polynomial multiplication can be more quickly implemented as entry-wise multiplication.

## Rounded canonical embeddings for RLWE

This embedding is for a family of FHE schemes related to the CKKS scheme, which focuses on approximate computation.

Here the cleartext space and plaintext spaces change slightly. The cleartext space is $\mathbb{C}^{N/2}$, and the plaintext space is again $(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})[x] / (x^N + 1)$ for some machine-word-sized power of two $q$. As you’ll note, the cleartext space is continuous but the plaintext space is discrete, so this necessitates some sort of approximation.

Aside: In the literature you will see the plaintext space described as just $(\mathbb{Z}[x] / (x^N + 1)$, and while this works in principle, in practice doing so requires multiprecision integer computations, and ends up being slower than the alternative, which is to use a residue number system before encoding, and treat the plaintext space as $(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})[x] / (x^N + 1)$. I’ll say more about RNS encoding in the next section.

The encoding is easier to understand by first describing the decoding step. Given a polynomial $f \in (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})[x] / (x^N + 1)$, there is a map called the canonical embedding $\varphi: (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})[x] / (x^N + 1) \to \mathbb{C}^N$ that evaluates $f$ at the odd powers of a primitive $2N$-th root of unity. I.e., letting $\omega = e^{2\pi i / 2N}$, we have

$\varphi(f) = (f(\omega), f(\omega^3), f(\omega^5), \dots, f(\omega^{2N-1}))$

Aside: My algebraic number theory is limited (not much beyond a standard graduate course covering Galois theory), but this paper has some more background. My understanding is that we’re viewing the input polynomials as actually sitting inside the number field $\mathbb{Q}[x] / (x^N + 1)$ (or else $q$ is a prime and the original polynomial ring is a field), and the canonical embedding is a specialization of a more general theorem that says that for any subfield $K \subset \mathbb{C}$, the Galois group $K/\mathbb{Q}$ is exactly the set of injective homomorphisms $K \to \mathbb{C}$. I don’t recall exactly why these polynomial quotient rings count as subfields of $\mathbb{C}$, and I think it is not completely trivial (see, e.g., this stack exchange question).

As specialized to this setting, the canonical embedding is a scaled isometry for the 2-norm in both spaces. See this paper for a lot more detail on that. This is a critical aspect of the analysis for FHE, since operations in the ciphertext space add perturbations (noise) in the plaintext space, and it must be the case that those perturbations decode to similar perturbations so that one can use bounds on noise growth in the plaintext space to ensure the corresponding cleartexts stay within some desired precision.

Because polynomials commute with complex conjugation ($f(\overline{z}) = \overline{f(z)}$), and roots of unity satisfy $\overline{\omega^k} = \omega^{-k}$, this canonical embedding is duplicating information. We can throw out the second half of the roots of unity and retain the same structure (the scaling in the isometry changes as well). The result is that the canonical embedding is defined $\varphi: (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})[x] / (x^N + 1) \to \mathbb{C}^{N/2}$ via

$\varphi(f) = (f(\omega), f(\omega^3), \dots, f(\omega^{N-1}))$

Since we’re again using the bit-field encoding to scale up the inputs for noise, the decoding is then defined by applying the canonical embedding, and then applying bit-field decoding (scaling down).

This decoding process embeds the discrete polynomial space inside $\mathbb{C}^{N/2}$ as a lattice, but input cleartexts need not lie on that lattice. And so we get to the encoding step, which involves rounding to a point on the lattice, then inverting the canonical embedding, then applying the bit-field encoding to scale up for noise.

Using commutativity, one can more specifically implement this by first inverting the canonical embedding (which again uses an FFT-like operation), the result of which is in $\mathbb{C}[x] / (x^N + 1)$, then apply the bit-field encoding to scale up, then round the coefficients to be in $\mathbb{Z}[x] / (x^N + 1)$. As mentioned above, if you want the coefficients to be machine-word-sized integers, you’ll have to design this all to ensure the outputs are sufficiently small, and then treat the output as $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}[x] / (x^N + 1)$. Or else use a RNS mechanism.

## Residue Number System Pre-processing

In all of the above schemes, the cleartext spaces can be too small for practical use. In the CGGI scheme, for example, a typical cleartext space is only 3 or 4 bits. Some FHE schemes manage this by representing everything in terms of boolean circuits, and pack inputs to various boolean gates in those bits. That is what I’ve mainly focused on, but it has the downside of increasing the number of FHE operations, requiring deeper circuits and more noise management operations, which are slow. Other approaches try to use the numerical structure of the ciphertexts more deliberately, and Sunzi’s Theorem (colloquially known as the Chinese Remainder Theorem) comes to the rescue here.

There will be two “cleartext” spaces floating around here, one for the “original” message, which I’ll call the “original” cleartext space, and one for the Sunzi’s-theorem-decomposed message, which I’ll call the “RNS” cleartext space (RNS for residue number system).

The original cleartext space size $M$ must be a product of primes or co-prime integers $M = m_1 \cdot \dots \cdot m_r$, with each $m_i$ being small enough to be compatible with the desired FHE’s encoding. E.g., for a bit-field encoding, $M$ might be large, but each $m_i$ would have to be at most a 4-bit prime (which severely limits how much we can decompose).

Then, we represent a single original cleartext message $x \in \mathbb{Z}/M\mathbb{Z}$ via its residues mod each $m_i$. I.e., $x$ becomes $r$ different cleartexts $(x \mod m_1, x \mod m_2, \dots, x \mod m_r)$ in the RNS cleartext space. From there we can either encode all the cleartexts in a single plaintext—the various RLWE encodings support this so long as $r < N$ (or $N/2$ for the canonical embedding))—or else encode them as difference plaintexts. In the latter case, the executing program needs to ensure the plaintexts are jointly processed. E.g., any operation that happens to one must happen to all, to ensure that the residues stay in sync and can be reconstructed at the end.

And finally, after decoding we use the standard reconstruction algorithm from Sunzi’s theorem to rebuild the original cleartext from the decoded RNS cleartexts.

I’d like to write a bit more about RNS decompositions and Sunzi’s theorem in a future article, because it is critical to how many FHE schemes operate, and influences a lot of their designs. For example, I glazed over how inverting the canonical embedding works in detail, and it is related to Sunzi’s theorem in a deep way. So more on that in the future.

# Sample Extraction from RLWE to LWE

In this article I’ll derive a trick used in FHE called sample extraction. In brief, it allows one to partially convert a ciphertext in the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) scheme to the Learning With Errors (LWE) scheme.

Here are some other articles I’ve written about other FHE building blocks, though they are not prerequisites for this article.

## LWE and RLWE

The first two articles in the list above define the Learning With Errors problem (LWE). I will repeat the definition here:

LWE: The LWE encryption scheme has the following parameters:

• A plaintext space $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$, where $q \geq 2$ is a positive integer. This is the space that the underlying message $m$ comes from.
• An LWE dimension $n \in \mathbb{N}$.
• A discrete Gaussian error distribution $D$ with a mean of zero and a fixed standard deviation.

An LWE secret key is defined as a vector $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (uniformly sampled). An LWE ciphertext is defined as a vector $a = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$, sampled uniformly over $(\mathbb{Z} / q\mathbb{Z})^n$, and a scalar $b = \langle a, s \rangle + m + e$, where $m$ is the message, $e$ is drawn from $D$ and all arithmetic is done modulo $q$. Note: the message $m$ usually is represented by placing an even smaller message (say, a 4-bit message) in the highest-order bits of a 32-bit unsigned integer. So then decryption corresponds to computing $b – \langle a, s \rangle = m + e$ and rounding the result to recover $m$ while discarding $e$.

Without the error term, an attacker could determine the secret key from a polynomial-sized collection of LWE ciphertexts with something like Gaussian elimination. The set of samples looks like a linear (or affine) system, where the secret key entries are the unknown variables. With an error term, the problem of solving the system is believed to be hard, and only exponential time/space algorithms are known.

RLWE: The Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem is the natural analogue of LWE, where all scalars involved are replaced with polynomials over a (carefully) chosen ring.

Formally, the RLWE encryption scheme has the following parameters:

• A ring $R = \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$, where $q \geq 2$ is a positive integer. This is the space of coefficients of all polynomials in the scheme. I usually think of $q$ as $2^{32}$, i.e., unsigned 32-bit integers.
• A plaintext space $R[x] / (x^N + 1)$, where $N$ is a power of 2. This is the space that the underlying message $m(x)$ comes from, and it is encoded as a list of $N$ integers forming the coefficients of the polynomial.
• An RLWE dimension $n \in \mathbb{N}$.
• A discrete Gaussian error distribution $D$ with a mean of zero and a fixed standard deviation.

An RLWE secret key $s$ is defined as a list of $n$ polynomials with binary coefficients in $\mathbb{B}[x] / (x^N+1)$, where $\mathbb{B} = \{0, 1\}$. The coefficients are uniformly sampled, like in LWE. An RLWE ciphertext is defined as a vector of $n$ polynomials $a = (a_1(x), \dots, a_n(x))$, sampled uniformly over $(R[x] / (x^N+1))^n$, and a polynomial $b(x) = \langle a, s \rangle + m(x) + e(x)$, where $m(x)$ is the message (with a similar “store it in the top bits” trick as LWE), $e(x)$ is a polynomial with coefficients drawn from $D$ and all the products of the inner product are done in $R[x] / (x^N+1)$. Decryption in RLWE involves computing $b(x) – \langle a, s \rangle$ and rounding appropriately to recover $m(x)$. Just like with RLWE, the message is “hidden” in the noise added to an equation corresponding to the polynomial products (i.e., without the noise and with enough sample encryptions of the same message/secret key, you can solve the system and recover the message). For more notes on how polynomial multiplication ends up being tricker in this ring, see my negacyclic polynomial multiplication article.

The most common version of RLWE you will see in the literature sets the vector dimension $n=1$, and so the secret key $s$ is a single polynomial, the ciphertext is a single polynomial, and RLWE can be viewed as directly replacing the vector dot product in LWE with a polynomial product. However, making $n$ larger is believed to provide more security, and it can be traded off against making the polynomial degree smaller, which can be useful when tweaking parameters for performance (keeping the security level constant).

## Sample Extraction

Sample extraction is the trick of taking an RLWE encryption of $m(x) = m_0 + m_1(x) + \dots + m_{N-1}x^{N-1}$, and outputting an LWE encryption of $m_0$. In our case, the degree $N$ and the dimension $n_{\textup{RLWE}}$ of the input RLWE ciphertext scheme is fixed, but we may pick the dimension $n_{\textup{LWE}}$ of the LWE scheme as we choose to make this trick work.

This is one of those times in math when it is best to “just work it out with a pencil.” It turns out there are no serious obstacles to our goal. We start with polynomials $a = (a_1(x), \dots, a_n(x))$ and $b(x) = \langle a, s \rangle + m(x) + e(x)$, and we want to produce a vector of scalars $(x_1, \dots, x_D)$ of some dimension $D$, a corresponding secret key $s$, and a $b = \langle a, s \rangle + m_0 + e’$, where $e’$ may be different from the input error $e(x)$, but is hopefully not too much larger.

As with many of the articles in this series, we employ the so-called “phase function” to help with the analysis, which is just the partial decryption of an RLWE ciphertext without the rounding step: $\varphi(x) = b(x) – \langle a, s \rangle = m(x) + e(x)$. The idea is as follows: inspect the structure of the constant term of $\varphi(x)$, oh look, it’s an LWE encryption.

So let’s expand the constant term of $b(x) – \langle a, s \rangle$. Given a polynomial expression, I will use the notation $(-)[0]$ to denote the constant coefficient, and $(-)[k]$ for the $k$-th coefficient.

\begin{aligned}(b(x) – \langle a, s \rangle)[0] &= b[0] – \left ( (a_1s_1)[0] + \dots + (a_n s_n)[0] \right ) \end{aligned}

Each entry in the dot product is a negacyclic polynomial product, so its constant term requires summing all the pairs of coefficients of $a_i$ and $s_i$ whose degrees sum to zero mod $N$, and flipping signs when there’s wraparound. In particular, a single product above for $a_i s_i$ has the form:

$$(a_is_i) [0] = s_i[0]a_i[0] – s_i[1]a_i[N-1] – s_i[2]a_i[N-2] – \dots – s_i[N-1]a_i[1]$$

Notice that I wrote the coefficients of $s_i$ in increasing order. This was on purpose, because if we re-write this expression $(a_is_i)[0]$ as a dot product, we get

$$(a_is_i[0]) = \left \langle (s_i[0], s_i[1], \dots, s_i[N-1]), (a_i[0], -a_i[N-1], \dots, -a_i[1])\right \rangle$$

In particular, the $a_i[k]$ are public, so we can sign-flip and reorder them easily in our conversion trick. But $s_i$ is unknown at the time the sample extraction needs to occur, so it helps if we can leave the secret key untouched. And indeed, when we apply the above expansion to all of the terms in the computation of $\varphi(x)[0]$, we end up manipulating the $a_i$’s a lot, but merely “flattening” the coefficients of $s = (s_1(x), \dots, s_n(x))$ into a single long vector.

So combining all of the above products, we see that $(b(x) – \langle a, s \rangle)[0]$ is already an LWE encryption with $(x, y) = ((x_1, \dots, x_D), b[0])$, and $x$ being the very long ($D = n*N$) vector

\begin{aligned} x = (& a_0[0], -a_0[N-1], \dots, -a_0[1], \\ &a_1[0], -a_1[N-1], \dots, -a_1[1], \\ &\dots , \\ &a_n[0], -a_n[N-1], \dots, -a_n[1] ) \end{aligned}

And the corresponding secret key is

\begin{aligned} s_{\textup{LWE}} = (& (s_0[0], s_0[1], \dots, s_0[N-1] \\ &(s_1[0], s_1[1], \dots, s_1[N-1], \\ &\dots , \\ &s_n[0], s_n[1], \dots, s_n[N-1] ) \end{aligned}

And the error in this ciphertext is exactly the constant coefficient of the error polynomial $e(x)$ from the RLWE encryption, which is independent of the error of all the other coefficients.

## Commentary

This trick is a best case scenario. Unlike with key switching, we don’t need to encrypt the output LWE secret key to perform the conversion. And unlike modulus switching, there is no impact on the error growth in the conversion from RLWE to LWE. So in a sense, this trick is “perfect,” though it loses information about the other coefficients of $m(x)$ in the process. As it happens, the CGGI FHE scheme that these articles are building toward only uses the constant coefficient.

The only twist to think about is that the output LWE ciphertext is dependent on the RLWE scheme parameters. What if you wanted to get a smaller-dimensional LWE ciphertext as output? This is a realistic concern, as in the CGGI FHE scheme one starts from an LWE ciphertext of one dimension, goes to RLWE of another (larger) dimension, and needs to get back to LWE of the original dimension by the end.

To do this, you have two options: one is to pick the RLWE ciphertext parameters $n, N$, so that their product is the value you need. A second is to allow the RLWE parameters to be whatever you need for performance/security, and then employ a key switching operation after the sample extraction to get back to the LWE parameters you need.

It is worth mentioning—though I am far from fully understanding the methods—there other ways to convert between LWE and RLWE. One can go from LWE to RLWE, or from a collection of LWEs to RLWE. Some methods can be found in this paper and its references.

Until next time!

# Estimating the Security of Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE)

This article was written by my colleague, Cathie Yun. Cathie is an applied cryptographer and security engineer, currently working with me to make fully homomorphic encryption a reality at Google. She’s also done a lot of cool stuff with zero knowledge proofs.

In previous articles, we’ve discussed techniques used in Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes. The basis for many FHE schemes, as well as other privacy-preserving protocols, is the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. In this article, we’ll talk about how to estimate the security of lattice-based schemes that rely on the hardness of LWE, as well as its widely used variant, Ring LWE (RLWE).

A previous article on modulus switching introduced LWE encryption, but as a refresher:

## Reminder of LWE

A literal repetition from the modulus switching article. The LWE encryption scheme I’ll use has the following parameters:

• A plaintext space $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$, where $q \geq 2$ is a positive integer. This is the space that the underlying message comes from.
• An LWE dimension $n \in \mathbb{N}$.
• A discrete Gaussian error distribution $D$ with a mean of zero and a fixed standard deviation.

An LWE secret key is defined as a vector in $\{0, 1\}^n$ (uniformly sampled). An LWE ciphertext is defined as a vector $a = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$, sampled uniformly over $(\mathbb{Z} / q\mathbb{Z})^n$, and a scalar $b = \langle a, s \rangle + m + e$, where $e$ is drawn from $D$ and all arithmetic is done modulo $q$. Note that $e$ must be small for the encryption to be valid.

## Learning With Errors (LWE) security

Choosing appropriate LWE parameters is a nontrivial challenge when designing and implementing LWE based schemes, because there are conflicting requirements of security, correctness, and performance. Some of the parameters that can be manipulated are the LWE dimension $n$, error distribution $D$ (referred to in the next few sections as $X_e$), secret distribution $X_s$, and plaintext modulus $q$.

## Lattice Estimator

Here is where the Lattice Estimator tool comes to our assistance! The lattice estimator is a Sage module written by a group of lattice cryptography researchers which estimates the concrete security of Learning with Errors (LWE) instances.

For a given set of LWE parameters, the Lattice Estimator calculates the cost of all known efficient lattice attacks – for example, the Primal, Dual, and Coded-BKW attacks. It returns the estimated number of “rops” or “ring operations” required to carry out each attack; the attack that is the most efficient is the one that determines the security parameter. The bits of security for the parameter set can be calculated as $\log_2(\text{rops})$ for the most efficient attack.

For example, we used this script to sweep over a decent subset of the parameter space of LWE to determine which parameter settings had 128-bit security.

## Running the Lattice Estimator

For example, let’s estimate the security of the security parameters originally published for the popular TFHE scheme:

n = 630
q = 2^32
Xs = UniformMod(2)
Xe = DiscreteGaussian(stddev=2^17)


After installing the Lattice Estimator and sage, we run the following commands in sage:

> from estimator import *
> schemes.TFHE630
LWEParameters(n=630, q=4294967296, Xs=D(σ=0.50, μ=-0.50), Xe=D(σ=131072.00), m=+Infinity, tag='TFHE630')
> _ = LWE.estimate(schemes.TFHE630)
bkw                  :: rop: ≈2^153.1, m: ≈2^139.4, mem: ≈2^132.6, b: 4, t1: 0, t2: 24, ℓ: 3, #cod: 552, #top: 0, #test: 78, tag: coded-bkw
usvp                 :: rop: ≈2^124.5, red: ≈2^124.5, δ: 1.004497, β: 335, d: 1123, tag: usvp
bdd                  :: rop: ≈2^131.0, red: ≈2^115.1, svp: ≈2^131.0, β: 301, η: 393, d: 1095, tag: bdd
bdd_hybrid           :: rop: ≈2^185.3, red: ≈2^115.9, svp: ≈2^185.3, β: 301, η: 588, ζ: 0, |S|: 1, d: 1704, prob: 1, ↻: 1, tag: hybrid
bdd_mitm_hybrid      :: rop: ≈2^265.5, red: ≈2^264.5, svp: ≈2^264.5, β: 301, η: 2, ζ: 215, |S|: ≈2^189.2, d: 1489, prob: ≈2^-146.6, ↻: ≈2^148.8, tag: hybrid
dual                 :: rop: ≈2^128.7, mem: ≈2^72.0, m: 551, β: 346, d: 1181, ↻: 1, tag: dual
dual_hybrid          :: rop: ≈2^119.8, mem: ≈2^115.5, m: 516, β: 314, d: 1096, ↻: 1, ζ: 50, tag: dual_hybrid


In this example, the most efficient attack is the dual_hybrid attack. It uses 2^119.8 ring operations, and so these parameters provide 119.8 bits of security. The reader may notice that the TFHE website claims those parameters give 128 bits of security. This discrepancy is due to the fact that they used an older library (the LWE estimator, which is no longer maintained), which doesn’t take into account the most up-to-date lattice attacks.

For further reading, Benjamin Curtis wrote an article about parameter selection for the CONCRETE implementation of the TFHE scheme. Benjamin Curtis, Martin Albrecht, and other researchers also used the Lattice Estimator to estimate all the LWE and NTRU schemes.

## Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) security

It is often desirable to use Ring LWE instead of LWE, for greater efficiency and smaller key sizes (as Chris Peikert illustrates via meme). We’d like to estimate the security of a Ring LWE scheme, but it wasn’t immediately obvious to us how to do this, since the Lattice Estimator only operates over LWE instances. In order to use the Lattice Estimator for this security estimate, we first needed to do a reduction from the RLWE instance to an LWE instance.

## Attempted RLWE to LWE reduction

Given an RLWE instance with $\text{RLWE_dimension} = k$ and $\text{poly_log_degree} = N$, we can create a relation that looks like an LWE instance of $\text{LWE_dimension} = N * k$ with the same security, as long as $N$ is a power of 2 and there are no known attacks that target the ring structure of RLWE that are more efficient than the best LWE attacks. Note: $N$ must be a power of 2 so that $x^N+1$ is a cyclotomic polynomial.

An RLWE encryption has the following form: $(a_0(x), a_1(x), … a_{k-1}(x), b(x))$

•   Public polynomials: $a_0(x), a_1(x), \dots a_{k-1}(x) \overset{{\scriptscriptstyle\$}}{\leftarrow} (\mathbb{Z}/{q \mathbb{Z}[x]} ) / (x^N + 1)^k$• Secret (binary) polynomials:$ s_0(x), s_1(x), \dots s_{k-1}(x) \overset{{\scriptscriptstyle\$}}{\leftarrow} (\mathbb{B}_N[x])^k$
•   Error: $e(x) \overset{{\scriptscriptstyle\$}}{\leftarrow} \chi_e$• RLWE instance:$ b(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} a_i(x) \cdot s_i(x) + e(x) \in (\mathbb{Z}/{q \mathbb{Z}[x]} ) / (x^N + 1)$We would like to express this in the form of an LWE encryption. We can make start with the simple case, where$ k=1 $. Therefore, we will only be working with the zero-entry polynomials,$a_0(x)$and$s_0(x)$. (For simplicity, in the next example you can ignore the zero-subscript and think of them as$a(x)$and$s(x)$). ## Naive reduction for$k=1$(wrong!) Naively, if we simply defined the LWE$A$matrix to be a concatenation of the coefficients of the RLWE polynomial$a(x)$, we get: $$A_{\text{LWE}} = ( a_{0, 0}, a_{0, 1}, \dots a_{0, N-1} )$$ We can do the same for the LWE$s$vector: $$s_{\text{LWE}} = ( s_{0, 0}, s_{0, 1}, \dots s_{0, N-1} )$$ But this doesn’t give us the value of$b_{LWE}$for the LWE encryption that we want. In particular, the first entry of$b_{LWE}$, which we can call$b_{\text{LWE}, 0}$, is simply a product of the first entries of$a_0(x)$and$s_0(x)$: $$b_{\text{LWE}, 0} = a_{0, 0} \cdot s_{0, 0} + e_0$$ However, we want$b_{\text{LWE}, 0}$to be a sum of the products of all the coefficients of$a_0(x)$and$s_0(x)$that give us a zero-degree coefficient mod$x^N + 1$. This modulus is important because it causes the product of high-degree monomials to “wrap around” to smaller degree monomials because of the negacyclic property, such that$x^N \equiv -1 \mod x^N + 1$. So the constant term$b_{\text{LWE}, 0}should include all of the following terms: \begin{aligned} b_{\text{LWE}, 0} = & a_{0, 0} \cdot s_{0, 0} \\ – & a_{0, 1} \cdot s_{0, N-1} \\ – & a_{0, 2} \cdot s_{0, N-2} \\ – & \dots \\ – & a_{0, N-1} \cdot s_{0, 1}\\ + & e_0\\ \end{aligned} ## Improved reduction fork=1$We can achieve the desired value of$b_{\text{LWE}}$by more strategically forming a matrix$A_{\text{LWE}}$, to reflect the negacyclic property of our polynomials in the RLWE space. We can keep the naive construction for$s_\text{LWE}$. $$A_{\text{LWE}} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{0, 0} & -a_{0, N-1} & -a_{0, N-2} & \dots & -a_{0, 1}\\ a_{0, 1} & a_{0, 0} & -a_{0, N-1} & \dots & -a_{0, 2}\\ \vdots & \ddots & & & \vdots \\ a_{0, N-1} & \dots & & & a_{0, 0} \\ \end{pmatrix}$$ This definition of$A_\text{LWE}$gives us the desired value for$b_\text{LWE}$, when$b_{\text{LWE}}$is interpreted as the coefficients of a polynomial. As an example, we can write out the elements of the first row of$b_\text{LWE}: \begin{aligned} b_{\text{LWE}, 0} = & \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} A_{\text{LWE}, 0, i} \cdot s_{0, i} + e_0 \\ b_{\text{LWE}, 0} = & a_{0, 0} \cdot s_{0, 0} \\ – & a_{0, 1} \cdot s_{0, N-1} \\ – & a_{0, 2} \cdot s_{0, N-2} \\ – & \dots \\ – & a_{0, N-1} \cdot s_{0, 1}\\ + & e_0 \\ \end{aligned} ## Generalizing for allk$In the generalized$k$case, we have the RLWE equation: $$b(x) = a_0(x) \cdot s_0(x) + a_1(x) \cdot s_1(x) \cdot a_{k-1}(x) \cdot s_{k-1}(x) + e(x)$$ We can construct the LWE elements as follows: $$A_{\text{LWE}} = \left ( \begin{array}{c|c|c|c} A_{0, \text{LWE}} & A_{1, \text{LWE}} & \dots & A_{k-1, \text{LWE}} \end{array} \right )$$ where each sub-matrix is the construction from the previous section: $$A_{\text{LWE}} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{i, 0} & -a_{i, N-1} & -a_{i, N-2} & \dots & -a_{i, 1}\\ a_{i, 1} & a_{i, 0} & -a_{i, N-1} & \dots & -a_{i, 2}\\ \vdots & \ddots & & & \vdots \\ a_{i, N-1} & \dots & & & a_{i, 0} \\ \end{pmatrix}$$ And the secret keys are stacked similarly: $$s_{\text{LWE}} = ( s_{0, 0}, s_{0, 1}, \dots s_{0, N-1} \mid s_{1, 0}, s_{1, 1}, \dots s_{1, N-1} \mid \dots )$$ This is how we can reduce an RLWE instance with RLWE dimension$k$and polynomial modulus degree$N$, to a relation that looks like an LWE instance of LWE dimension$N * k$. ## Caveats and open research This reduction does not result in a correctly formed LWE instance, since an LWE instance would have a matrix$A$that is randomly sampled, whereas the reduction results in an matrix$A$that has cyclic structure, due to the cyclic property of the RLWE instance. This is why I’ve been emphasizing that the reduction produces an instance that looks like LWE. All currently known attacks on RLWE do not take advantage of the structure, but rather directly attack this transformed LWE instance. Whether the additional ring structure can be exploited in the design of more efficient attacks remains an open question in the lattice cryptography research community. In her PhD thesis, Rachel Player mentions the RLWE to LWE security reduction: In order to try to pick parameters in Ring-LWE-based schemes (FHE or otherwise) that we hope are sufficiently secure, we can choose parameters such that the underlying Ring-LWE instance should be hard to solve according to known attacks. Each Ring-LWE sample can be used to extract$n$LWE samples. To the best of our knowledge, the most powerful attacks against$d$-sample Ring-LWE all work by instead attacking the$nd$-sample LWE problem. When estimating the security of a particular set of Ring-LWE parameters we therefore estimate the security of the induced set of LWE parameters. This indicates that we can do this reduction for certain RLWE instances. However, we must be careful to ensure that the polynomial modulus degree$N$is a power of two, because otherwise the error distribution “breaks”, as my colleague Baiyu Li explained to me in conversation: The RLWE problem is typically defined in using the ring of integers of the cyclotomic field$\mathbb{Q}[X]/(f(X))$, where$f(X)$is a cyclotomic polynomial of degree$k=\phi(N)$(where$\phi$is Euler’s totient function), and the error is a spherical Gaussian over the image of the canonical embedding into the complex numbers$\mathbb{C}^k$(basically the images of primitive roots of unity under$f$). In many cases we set$N$to be a power of 2, thus$f(X)=X^{N/2}+1$, since the canonical embedding for such$N$has a nice property that the preimage of the spherical Gaussian error is also a spherical Gaussian over the coefficients of polynomials in$\mathbb{Q}[X]/(f(X))$. So in this case we can sample$k=N/2$independent Gaussian numbers and use them as the coefficients of the error polynomial$e(x)$. For$N$not a power of 2,$f(X)$may have some low degree terms, and in order to get the spherical Gaussian with the same variance$s^2$in the canonical embedding, we probably need to use a larger variance when sampling the error polynomial coefficients. The RLWE we frequently use in practice is actually a specialized version called “polynomial LWE”, and instantiated with$N$= power of 2 and so$f(X)=X^{N/2}+1$. For other parameters the two are not exactly the same. This paper has some explanations: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/170.pdf The error distribution “breaks” if$N$is not a power of 2 due to the fact that the precise form of RLWE is not defined on integer polynomial rings$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(f(X))$, but is defined on its dual (or the dual in the underlying number field, which is a fractional ideal of$\mathbb{Q}[X]/(f(x))$), and the noise distribution is on the Minkowski embedding of this dual ring. For non-power of 2$N$, the product mod$f$of two small polynomials in$\mathbb{Q}[X]/(f(x))$may be large, where small/large means their L2 norm on the coefficient vector. This means that in order to sample the required noise distribution, you may need a skewed coefficient distribution. Only when$N$is a power of 2, the dual of$R$is a scaling of$R$, and distance in the embedding of$R^{\text{dual}}$is preserved in$R$, and so we can just sample iid gaussian coefficient to get the required noise. Because working with a power-of-two RLWE polynomial modulus gives “nice” error behavior, this parameter choice is often recommended and chosen for concrete instantiations of RLWE. For example, the Homomorphic Encryption Standard recommends and only analyzes the security of parameters for power-of-two cyclotomic fields for use in homomorphic encryption (though future versions of the standard aim to extend the security analysis to generic cyclotomic rings): We stress that when the error is chosen from sufficiently wide and “well spread” distributions that match the ring at hand, we do not have meaningful attacks on RLWE that are better than LWE attacks, regardless of the ring. For power-of-two cyclotomics, it is sufficient to sample the noise in the polynomial basis, namely choosing the coefficients of the error polynomial$e \in \mathbb{Z}[x] / \phi_k(x)$independently at random from a very “narrow” distribution. Existing works analyzing and targeting the ring structure of RLWE include: It would of course be great to have a definitive answer on whether we can be confident using this RLWE to LWE reduction to estimate the security of RLWE based schemes. In the meantime, we have seen many Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes using this RLWE to LWE reduction, and we hope that this article helps explain how that reduction works and the existing open questions around this approach. # Negacyclic Polynomial Multiplication In this article I’ll cover three techniques to compute special types of polynomial products that show up in lattice cryptography and fully homomorphic encryption. Namely, the negacyclic polynomial product, which is the product of two polynomials in the quotient ring$\mathbb{Z}[x] / (x^N + 1)$. As a precursor to the negacyclic product, we’ll cover the simpler cyclic product. All of the Python code written for this article is on GitHub. ## The DFT and Cyclic Polynomial Multiplication A recent program gallery piece showed how single-variable polynomial multiplication could be implemented using the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). This boils down to two observations: 1. The product of two polynomials$f, g$can be computed via the convolution of the coefficients of$f$and$g$. 2. The Convolution Theorem, which says that the Fourier transform of a convolution of two signals$f, g$is the point-wise product of the Fourier transforms of the two signals. (The same holds for the DFT) This provides a much faster polynomial product operation than one could implement using the naïve polynomial multiplication algorithm (though see the last section for an implementation anyway). The DFT can be used to speed up large integer multiplication as well. A caveat with normal polynomial multiplication is that one needs to pad the input coefficient lists with enough zeros so that the convolution doesn’t “wrap around.” That padding results in the output having length at least as large as the sum of the degrees of$f$and$g$(see the program gallery piece for more details). If you don’t pad the polynomials, instead you get what’s called a cyclic polynomial product. More concretely, if the two input polynomials$f, g$are represented by coefficient lists$(f_0, f_1, \dots, f_{N-1}), (g_0, g_1, \dots, g_{N-1})$of length$N$(implying the inputs are degree at most$N-1$, i.e., the lists may end in a tail of zeros), then the Fourier Transform technique computes $f(x) \cdot g(x) \mod (x^N – 1)$ This modulus is in the sense of a quotient ring$\mathbb{Z}[x] / (x^N – 1)$, where$(x^N – 1)$denotes the ring ideal generated by$x^N-1$, i.e., all polynomials that are evenly divisible by$x^N – 1$. A particularly important interpretation of this quotient ring is achieved by interpreting the ideal generator$x^N – 1$as an equation$x^N – 1 = 0$, also known as$x^N = 1$. To get the canonical ring element corresponding to any polynomial$h(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$, you “set”$x^N = 1$and reduce the polynomial until there are no more terms with degree bigger than$N-1$. For example, if$N=5$then$x^{10} + x^6 – x^4 + x + 2 = -x^4 + 2x + 3$(the$x^{10}$becomes 1, and$x^6 = x$). To prove the DFT product computes a product in this particular ring, note how the convolution theorem produces the following formula, where$\textup{fprod}(f, g)$denotes the process of taking the Fourier transform of the two coefficient lists, multiplying them entrywise, and taking a (properly normalized) inverse FFT, and$\textup{fprod}(f, g)(j)$is the$j$-th coefficient of the output polynomial: $\textup{fprod}(f, g)(j) = \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} f_k g_{j-k \textup{ mod } N}$ In words, the output polynomial coefficient$j$equals the sum of all products of pairs of coefficients whose indices sum to$j$when considered “wrapping around”$N$. Fixing$j=1$as an example,$\textup{fprod}(f, g)(1) = f_0 g_1 + f_1g_0 + f_2 g_{N-1} + f_3 g_{N-2} + \dots$. This demonstrates the “set$x^N = 1$” interpretation above: the term$f_2 g_{N-1}$corresponds to the product$f_2x^2 \cdot g_{N-1}x^{N-1}$, which contributes to the$x^1$term of the polynomial product if and only if$x^{2 + N-1} = x$, if and only if$x^N = 1$. To achieve this in code, we simply use the version of the code from the program gallery piece, but fix the size of the arrays given to numpy.fft.fft in advance. We will also, for simplicity, assume the$N$one wishes to use is a power of 2. The resulting code is significantly simpler than the original program gallery code (we omit zero-padding to length$N$for brevity). import numpy from numpy.fft import fft, ifft def cyclic_polymul(p1, p2, N): """Multiply two integer polynomials modulo (x^N - 1). p1 and p2 are arrays of coefficients in degree-increasing order. """ assert len(p1) == len(p2) == N product = fft(p1) * fft(p2) inverted = ifft(product) return numpy.round(numpy.real(inverted)).astype(numpy.int32)  As a side note, there’s nothing that stops this from working with polynomials that have real or complex coefficients, but so long as we use small magnitude integer coefficients and round at the end, I don’t have to worry about precision issues (hat tip to Brad Lucier for suggesting an excellent paper by Colin Percival, “Rapid multiplication modulo the sum and difference of highly composite numbers“, which covers these precision issues in detail). ## Negacyclic polynomials, DFT with duplication Now the kind of polynomial quotient ring that shows up in cryptography is critically not$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^N-1)$, because that ring has enough easy-to-reason-about structure that it can’t hide secrets. Instead, cryptographers use the ring$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^N+1)$(the minus becomes a plus), which is believed to be more secure for cryptography—although I don’t have a great intuitive grasp on why. The interpretation is similar here as before, except we “set”$x^N = -1$instead of$x^N = 1$in our reductions. Repeating the above example, if$N=5$then$x^{10} + x^6 – x^4 + x + 2 = -x^4 + 3$(the$x^{10}$becomes$(-1)^2 = 1$, and$x^6 = -x$). It’s called negacyclic because as a term$x^k$passes$k \geq N$, it cycles back to$x^0 = 1$, but with a sign flip. The negacyclic polynomial multiplication can’t use the DFT without some special hacks. The first and simplest hack is to double the input lists with a negation. That is, starting from$f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^N+1)$, we can define$f^*(x) = f(x) – x^Nf(x)$in a different ring$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{2N} – 1)$(and similarly for$g^*$and$g$). Before seeing how this causes the DFT to (almost) compute a negacyclic polynomial product, some math wizardry. The ring$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{2N} – 1)$is special because it contains our negacyclic ring as a subring. Indeed, because the polynomial$x^{2N} – 1$factors as$(x^N-1)(x^N+1)$, and because these two factors are coprime in$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{2N} – 1)$, the Chinese remainder theorem (aka Sun-tzu’s theorem) generalizes to polynomial rings and says that any polynomial in$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{2N} – 1)$is uniquely determined by its remainders when divided by$(x^N-1)$and$(x^N+1)$. Another way to say it is that the ring$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{2N} – 1)$factors as a direct product of the two rings$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{N} – 1)$and$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{N} + 1)$. Now mapping a polynomial$f(x)$from the bigger ring$(x^{2N} – 1)$to the smaller ring$(x^{N}+1)$involves taking a remainder of$f(x)$when dividing by$x^{N}+1$(“setting”$x^N = -1$and reducing). There are many possible preimage mappings, depending on what your goal is. In this case, we actually intentionally choose a non preimage mapping, because in general to compute a preimage requires solving a system of congruences in the larger polynomial ring. So instead we choose$f(x) \mapsto f^*(x) = f(x) – x^Nf(x) = -f(x)(x^N – 1)$, which maps back down to$2f(x)$in$\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{N} + 1)$. This preimage mapping has a particularly nice structure, in that you build it by repeating the polynomial’s coefficients twice and flipping the sign of the second half. It’s easy to see that the product$f^*(x) g^*(x)$maps down to$4f(x)g(x)$. So if we properly account for these extra constant factors floating around, our strategy to perform negacyclic polynomial multiplication is to map$f$and$g$up to the larger ring as described, compute their cyclic product (modulo$x^{2N} – 1$) using the FFT, and then the result should be a degree$2N-1$polynomial which can be reduced with one more modular reduction step to the right degree$N-1$negacyclic product, i.e., setting$x^N = -1$, which materializes as taking the second half of the coefficients, flipping their signs, and adding them to the corresponding coefficients in the first half. The code for this is: def negacyclic_polymul_preimage_and_map_back(p1, p2): p1_preprocessed = numpy.concatenate([p1, -p1]) p2_preprocessed = numpy.concatenate([p2, -p2]) product = fft(p1_preprocessed) * fft(p2_preprocessed) inverted = ifft(product) rounded = numpy.round(numpy.real(inverted)).astype(p1.dtype) return (rounded[: p1.shape[0]] - rounded[p1.shape[0] :]) // 4  However, this chosen mapping hides another clever trick. The product of the two preimages has enough structure that we can “read” the result off without doing the full “set$x^N = -1$” reduction step. Mapping$f$and$g$up to$f^*, g^*$and taking their product modulo$(x^{2N} – 1)gives \begin{aligned} f^*g^* &= -f(x^N-1) \cdot -g(x^N – 1) \\ &= fg (x^N-1)^2 \\ &= fg(x^{2N} – 2x^N + 1) \\ &= fg(2 – 2x^N) \\ &= 2(fg – x^Nfg) \end{aligned} This has the same syntactical format as the original mappingf \mapsto f – x^Nf$, with an extra factor of 2, and so its coefficients also have the form “repeat the coefficients and flip the sign of the second half” (times two). We can then do the “inverse mapping” by reading only the first half of the coefficients and dividing by 2. def negacyclic_polymul_use_special_preimage(p1, p2): p1_preprocessed = numpy.concatenate([p1, -p1]) p2_preprocessed = numpy.concatenate([p2, -p2]) product = fft(p1_preprocessed) * fft(p2_preprocessed) inverted = ifft(product) rounded = numpy.round(0.5 * numpy.real(inverted)).astype(p1.dtype) return rounded[: p1.shape[0]]  Our chosen mapping$f \mapsto f-x^Nf$is not particularly special, except that it uses a small number of pre and post-processing operations. For example, if you instead used the mapping$f \mapsto 2f + x^Nf$(which would map back to$f$exactly), then the FFT product would result in$5fg + 4x^Nfg$in the larger ring. You can still read off the coefficients as before, but you’d have to divide by 5 instead of 2 (which, the superstitious would say, is harder). It seems that “double and negate” followed by “halve and take first half” is the least amount of pre/post processing possible. ## Negacyclic polynomials with a “twist” The previous section identified a nice mapping (or embedding) of the input polynomials into a larger ring. But studying that shows some symmetric structure in the FFT output. I.e., the coefficients of$f$and$g$are repeated twice, with some scaling factors. It also involves taking an FFT of two$2N$-dimensional vectors when we start from two$N$-dimensional vectors. This sort of situation should make you think that we can do this more efficiently, either by using a smaller size FFT or by packing some data into the complex part of the input, and indeed we can do both. [Aside: it’s well known that if all the entries of an FFT input are real, then the result also has symmetry that can be exploted for efficiency by reframing the problem as a size-N/2 FFT in some cases, and just removing half the FFT algorithm’s steps in other cases, see Wikipedia for more] This technique was explained in Fast multiplication and its applications (pdf link) by Daniel Bernstein, a prominent cryptographer who specializes in cryptography performance, and whose work appears in widely-used standards like TLS, OpenSSH, and he designed a commonly used elliptic curve for cryptography. [Aside: Bernstein cites this technique as using something called the “Tangent FFT (pdf link).” This is a drop-in FFT replacement he invented that is faster than previous best (split-radix FFT), and Bernstein uses it mainly to give a precise expression for the number of operations required to do the multiplication end to end. We will continue to use the numpy FFT implementation, since in this article I’m just focusing on how to express negacyclic multiplication in terms of the FFT. Also worth noting both the Tangent FFT and “Fast multiplication” papers frame their techniques—including FFT algorithm implementations!—in terms of polynomial ring factorizations and mappings. Be still, my beating cardioid.] In terms of polynomial mappings, we start from the ring$\mathbb{R}[x] / (x^N + 1)$, where$N$is a power of 2. We then pick a reversible mapping from$\mathbb{R}[x]/(x^N + 1) \to \mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{N/2} – 1)$(note the field change from real to complex), apply the FFT to the image of the mapping, and reverse appropriately it at the end. One such mapping takes two steps, first mapping$\mathbb{R}[x]/(x^N + 1) \to \mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{N/2} – i)$and then from$\mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{N/2} – i) \to \mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{N/2} – 1)$. The first mapping is as easy as the last section, because$(x^N + 1) = (x^{N/2} + i) (x^{N/2} – i)$, and so we can just set$x^{N/2} = i$and reduce the polynomial. This as the effect of making the second half of the polynomial’s coefficients become the complex part of the first half of the coefficients. The second mapping is more nuanced, because we’re not just reducing via factorization. And we can’t just map$i \mapsto 1$generically, because that would reduce complex numbers down to real values. Instead, we observe that (momentarily using an arbitrary degree$k$instead of$N/2$), for any polynomial$f \in \mathbb{C}[x]$, the remainder of$f \mod x^k-i$uniquely determines the remainder of$f \mod x^k – 1$via the change of variables$x \mapsto \omega_{4k} x$, where$\omega_{4k}$is a$4k$-th primitive root of unity$\omega_{4k} = e^{\frac{2 \pi i}{4k}}$. Spelling this out in more detail: if$f(x) \in \mathbb{C}[x]$has remainder$f(x) = g(x) + h(x)(x^k – i)$for some polynomial$h(x), then \begin{aligned} f(\omega_{4k}x) &= g(\omega_{4k}x) + h(\omega_{4k}x)((\omega_{4k}x)^{k} – i) \\ &= g(\omega_{4k}x) + h(\omega_{4k}x)(e^{\frac{\pi i}{2}} x^k – i) \\ &= g(\omega_{4k}x) + i h(\omega_{4k}x)(x^k – 1) \\ &= g(\omega_{4k}x) \mod (x^k – 1) \end{aligned} Translating this back tok=N/2$, the mapping from$\mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{N/2} – i) \to \mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{N/2} – 1)$is$f(x) \mapsto f(\omega_{2N}x)$. And if$f = f_0 + f_1x + \dots + f_{N/2 – 1}x^{N/2 – 1}$, then the mapping involves multiplying each coefficient$f_k$by$\omega_{2N}^k$. When you view polynomials as if they were a simple vector of their coefficients, then this operation$f(x) \mapsto f(\omega_{k}x)$looks like$(a_0, a_1, \dots, a_n) \mapsto (a_0, \omega_{k} a_1, \dots, \omega_k^n a_n)$. Bernstein calls the operation a twist of$\mathbb{C}^n$, which I mused about in this Mathstodon thread. What’s most important here is that each of these transformations are invertible. The first because the top half coefficients end up in the complex parts of the polynomial, and the second because the mapping$f(x) \mapsto f(\omega_{2N}^{-1}x)$is an inverse. Together, this makes the preprocessing and postprocessing exact inverses of each other. The code is then def negacyclic_polymul_complex_twist(p1, p2): n = p2.shape[0] primitive_root = primitive_nth_root(2 * n) root_powers = primitive_root ** numpy.arange(n // 2) p1_preprocessed = (p1[: n // 2] + 1j * p1[n // 2 :]) * root_powers p2_preprocessed = (p2[: n // 2] + 1j * p2[n // 2 :]) * root_powers p1_ft = fft(p1_preprocessed) p2_ft = fft(p2_preprocessed) prod = p1_ft * p2_ft ifft_prod = ifft(prod) ifft_rotated = ifft_prod * primitive_root ** numpy.arange(0, -n // 2, -1) return numpy.round( numpy.concatenate([numpy.real(ifft_rotated), numpy.imag(ifft_rotated)]) ).astype(p1.dtype)  And so, at the cost of a bit more pre- and postprocessing, we can negacyclically multiply two degree$N-1$polynomials using an FFT of length$N/2$. In theory, no information is wasted and this is optimal. ## And finally, a simple matrix multiplication The last technique I wanted to share is not based on the FFT, but it’s another method for doing negacyclic polynomial multiplication that has come in handy in situations where I am unable to use FFTs. I call it the Toeplitz method, because one of the polynomials is converted to a Toeplitz matrix. Sometimes I hear it referred to as a circulant matrix technique, but due to the negacyclic sign flip, I don’t think it’s a fully accurate term. The idea is to put the coefficients of one polynomial$f(x) = f_0 + f_1x + \dots + f_{N-1}x^{N-1}$into a matrix as follows: $\begin{pmatrix} f_0 & -f_{N-1} & \dots & -f_1 \\ f_1 & f_0 & \dots & -f_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ f_{N-1} & f_{N-2} & \dots & f_0 \end{pmatrix}$ The polynomial coefficients are written down in the first column unchanged, then in each subsequent column, the coefficients are cyclically shifted down one, and the term that wraps around the top has its sign flipped. When the second polynomial is treated as a vector of its coefficients, say,$g(x) = g_0 + g_1x + \dots + g_{N-1}x^{N-1}$, then the matrix-vector product computes their negacyclic product (as a vector of coefficients): $\begin{pmatrix} f_0 & -f_{N-1} & \dots & -f_1 \\ f_1 & f_0 & \dots & -f_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ f_{N-1} & f_{N-2} & \dots & f_0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} g_0 \\ g_1 \\ \vdots \\ g_{N-1} \end{pmatrix}$ This works because each row$j$corresponds to one output term$x^j\$, and the cyclic shift for that row accounts for the degree-wrapping, with the sign flip accounting for the negacyclic part. (If there were no sign attached, this method could be used to compute a cyclic polynomial product).

The Python code for this is

def cylic_matrix(c: numpy.array) -> numpy.ndarray:
"""Generates a cyclic matrix with each row of the input shifted.

For input: [1, 2, 3], generates the following matrix:

[[1 2 3]
[2 3 1]
[3 1 2]]
"""
c = numpy.asarray(c).ravel()
a, b = numpy.ogrid[0 : len(c), 0 : -len(c) : -1]
indx = a + b
return c[indx]

def negacyclic_polymul_toeplitz(p1, p2):
n = len(p1)

# Generates a sign matrix with 1s below the diagonal and -1 above.
up_tri = numpy.tril(numpy.ones((n, n), dtype=int), 0)
low_tri = numpy.triu(numpy.ones((n, n), dtype=int), 1) * -1
sign_matrix = up_tri + low_tri

cyclic_matrix = cylic_matrix(p1)
toeplitz_p1 = sign_matrix * cyclic_matrix
return numpy.matmul(toeplitz_p1, p2)


Obviously on most hardware this would be less efficient than an FFT-based method (and there is some relationship between circulant matrices and Fourier Transforms, see Wikipedia). But in some cases—when the polynomials are small, or one of the two polynomials is static, or a particular hardware choice doesn’t handle FFTs with high-precision floats very well, or you want to take advantage of natural parallelism in the matrix-vector product—this method can be useful. It’s also simpler to reason about.

Until next time!